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For many years, businesses in private industry have been
utilizing and experimenting with various forms of
performance-based pay. These innovations have been part of a
continuing search by organizations for better approaches to
administering pay. With the passing of the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978, the Federal Government began its own form
of this concept entitled, "Merit Pay". Although many studies
have examined uses in the areas of pay and total compensation,
and even in the narrower area of performance-based pay, these
studies have focused primarily on the private sector. This is
not surprising since "merit pay" has only been in widespread
use in the Federal sector for the past two (2) years. How-
ever, even in its infancy, there are indications that the pay
for performance concept in the Federal Government has not
lived up to its expectations. This thesis examines the
Federal Government's experience with pay-f or-performance
,
discusses the probable effectiveness of "merit pay" as it now
stands, and recommends specific actions for more effective
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"Pay-for-performance" is quite simply the attempt, within
available funds, to recognize and reward quality performance
by granting pay increases in varying amounts based upon job
performance. This concept embodies two major beliefs:
1. That pay decisions should be based upon demonstrated
performance, and
2. That pay is, or has the potential of being, an
effective motivator of performance.
At one time it was safe to say that most companies in the
private sector were under a pay for performance system and
that the Federal Government was under a job rate system which
based salary progressions primarily on time in the job.
However, in recent years, the civil service is moving towards
performance-based pay while many companies are moving away
from it.
The Government began its venture into performance-based
pay as a result of the Civil Service Reform Act (Public Law
95-454) which was approved October 13, 1978, The Act
established a Merit Pay System for high-level supervisers and
management officials (grades GS-13 through GS-15) in which
annual performance appraisals would be the basis for merit
pay increases (Appendix A). Eliminated were within-grade

salary increases which provided progressive pay raises based
on time spent in a specific grade.
The literature on organizations is full of beliefs,
myths, and opinions concerning how much employees should be
paid and what procedures should be used to pay them. It is
probable that no other topic concerning the management of
organizations is a subject of more debate, controversy, and
misunderstanding. A major point in the controversy concerns
the concept of pay as a motivator—some researchers contend
that internal job satisfaction, among other things, is the
motivator rather than externally mediated rewards and that,
therefore, merit pay should be discounted as a motivator.
Another group contends that the merit pay concept is valid,
being based on the "law of effect" (i.e., behavior that
appears to lead to a positive consequence tends to be
repeated) , and that any failure of this concept is due to
mismanagement of merit pay programs or to the lack of
understanding about them.
There are literally hundreds of mechanical approaches to
merit pay and numerous process choices that accompany these
approaches. This thesis will focus on the approach that the
Federal Government has taken and examine it in light of




This thesis is designed to provide the reader with an
introduction to the Federal Merit Pay system, an overview of
relevant research, an explanation of motivation and
performance theories, a review of both private and public
sector experience with performance-based pay, and conclusions
and recommendations for improvement or change.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an
explanation of Federal compensation practices— both merit
pay and non-merit pay. It will provide the background
necessary to understand the impact of merit pay on the
Federal Government and its employees.
Chapter II discusses the role of pay in influencing
individual and organizational behavior. It examines this
issue first from a historical perspective and then in light
of performance and motivation theories. The chapter
concludes with a review of relevant literature in the area of
pay and workforce motivation.
Chapter III examines the experiences of both the private
and public sectors with pay-f or-performance systems. It
explores various systems used by different organizations and
discusses their successes and their problems.
Chapter IV presents an evaluation of the Federal merit
pay system and delves into the reasons for its failure. It
examines the problems in light of specific actions taken by
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the Government and attempts to relate them to certain issues
discussed in Chapter II.
Chapter V discusses Congressional reaction to the merit
pay system. It also contains conclusions about the present
system and suggests the best alternative for improvement.
C. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL COMPENSATION PRACTICES
1. The General Schedule
Generally speaking, white collar workers within the
Federal Government are assigned to a General Schedule (GS)
rating based upon the job duties that they perform. These
ratings range from GS-1 (for relatively unskilled work such
as a messenger) to GS-15 (for very complex and responsible
work such as an Electrical Engineer or functional manager).
(Although higher level positions exist, they are for the most
part "ungraded" and are referred to as Senior Executive
Service positions.) Prior to the Civil Service Reform Act of
1978, the salaries of all GS positions were adjusted by three
methods: comparability adjustments, within-grade step
increases, and/or quality-step increases. With the
implementation of merit pay, however, supervisors and
management officials at grades 13, 14, and 15 were removed
from the general schedule and placed under a separte





The Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962 established
the comparability principle which states that Federal Salary
rates for white-collar employees under the General Schedule
should be comparable with private enterprise rates for the
same levels of work.
The Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 trans-
ferred primary responsibility for adjusting the General
Schedule pay scale from Congress to the executive branch.
Comparability findings and pay recommendations are submitted
to the President, who must either agree to the recommended
comparability pay adjustment or submit an alternative plan to
Congress which would go into effect unless a majority vote of
either House disapproved it. If the alternative plan is
disapproved, the President must make a comparability adjust-
ment according to the statute's principle of comparability.
In either case, comparability pay adjustments take effect in
October
.
b. Within-Grade Step Increases
Previous law (5 U.S.C. 5332) established the
matrix for General Schedule salaries. Under the fiscal year
1980 matrix (Appendix B)
,
grades GS-1 through GS-14 have a
30% pay range with 10 uniform steps, and GS-15 has a 23% pay
range with 8 steps. Each step is worth about 3.3% of the
minimum rate for the grade. Progression through step
12

increases is in addition to the general salary increases
(i.e., comparabiity adjustments) which occur each October.
Employees advance to the next step after
completing one year in steps one through three, two years in
steps four through six, and three years in steps seven
through nine
—
provided performance is of an "acceptable level
of competence" as certified by the supervisor. These
certifications are virtually routine— step increases are
received by 99% of all General Schedule employees on the date
of eligibility.
G Quality-Step Increases
The Federal Salary Reform Act of 1962 also
provided for recognition of exceptionally high-quality
performance through the granting of step increases which were
in addition to those achieved by "seniority". This provision
is generally considered a performance award. In the past,
quality step increases have been granted to less than 5% of
all Federal employees each year (.1% of payroll costs).
2. Merit Pay
The Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978
established a new pay system (GM: General Merit) for
supervisors and management officials in grades GS-13 through
GS-15, in which pay increases are to be based on performance.




1. Performance appraisals for merit pay employees must be
based on written, pre-established performance standards
and conducted much more rigorously than wasthe case
previously.
2, Merit pay employees are no longer guaranteed full
comparability (October) adjustments and are no longer
eligible for within-grade or quality-step increases.
Under the GM system, the basic pay of employees is
adjusted annually according to two factors:
(1) (2)
At least 50% of the + A merit pay = Total
annual October com- increase based dollar
parability on-job perfor- adjustment
mance
The total amount of payroll funds under the GM system
comes from the within-grade and quality-step increases that
would have been paid if GM employees were under the GS sys-
tem, plus the remaining portion of the October comparability
adjustment that was not automatically given to GM employees.
Thus, the same amount of money as was previously allocated is
still available to merit pay employees but it is distributed
differently, according to performance levels.
Merit increases are effective at the same time as the
regular October comparability adjustment, and become a
permanent part of basic pay (i.e., they are not one-time
"bonuses"). Since pay adjustments will vary according to
employee performance, an individual's salary can be set
14

anywhere within the salary range for that grade, as long as
it doesn't fall below the minimum or above the maximum.
Approximately 100 agencies in the Federal Government
are included in the merit pay program. About 128,000 Federal
employees, or 65% of the total GS-13, GS-14, and GS-15 grade
level population in these agencies are paid under the Merit
Pay System.
The Office of Personnel Management (0PM) took a
decentralized approach to implementation of the new system,
allowing agencies to design their own merit pay programs so
long as they met general 0PM guidelines and the statutory
requirements.
The Reform Act required merit pay provisions to be
implemented no later than October 1981. However, eight small
agencies with bout 2200 merit pay employees opted to
implement merit pay a year earlier and made payouts effective
October 1980.
Upon implementation of merit pay, 0PM said:
"... employees exceeding their [performance] standards
should, under the new system, receive salary increases
greater than they could have expected under the General
Schedule. Also, an employee's position in the pay range
will begin to reflect the quality of performance rather
than just time in grade. Merit pay should significantly
improve productivity, quality of work, service to the
public, and employee satisfaction with the reward system"
[Ref. 1].
As will be seen, 0PM' s optimism was rather overstated.
15

II. THE CARROT AND STICK
Basic to an understanding of the impact of pay in
organizations is an understanding of the relationship between
financial rewards and individual behavior. In this chapter,
these relationships are examined from a historical
perspective and in light of major theories and research
studies.
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
One of the basic beliefs in a capitalistic society is
that economic rewards come to those who engage in hard work.
The underlying concept behind this belief is known as the
Protestant ethic. In a nutshell, the Protestant ethic is a
religious or moral imperative which views man as being
isolated, competitive, and individualistic. Hard work is
seen as the means of accumulating wealth, which is viewed as
a desirable end.
These beliefs emphasizing individualism and profit
maximization, did not appear suddenly in the Western world.
Rather, they developed as an evolutionary process that had
its origins in the changing views of the church vis-a-vis
commercial activities in the latter part of the Middle Ages.
Changes in the religious ethic, brought about by the
Protestant Reformation, created an ethical and economic
16

climate that was very favorable to the progress of capitalism
and development of the Protestant ethics. The Calvinists,
who led the Protestant Reformation, viewed frugality, thrift,
and industry as virtues. To them, worldly success and
prosperity were construed as signs of God's approval for the
elect--those chosen by God for salvation. These views
provided a religious incentive for the spread of the profit
motive in Western society.
In the American colonies, puritanism continued the
emphasis on hard work and an accumulation of worldly goods as
a sign of God's grace. Weber saw in Benjamin Franklin's
homilies and writings the essence of the Protestant ethic,
and noted:
"If we thus ask, why should 'money be made out of men,'
Benjamin Franklin himself, although he was a colourless
desist, answers in his autobiography with a quotation from
the Bible, which his strict Calvinistic father drummed into
him again and again in his youth: 'Seest thou a man
diligent in his business? He shall stand before Kings.'
(Prov. xxii 29)" [Ref. 2].
In 1776, Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations , was published, giving the
capitalistic ethic its major ideology. Smith argued for
economic freedoms on the premise that by maximizing self-
interest, each individual would benefit the total society.
Up to the late 1800's, there seemed to be little interest
in management thought or philosophy; management style
depended more on the unique personality of the supervisor
17

than on any well-defined body of knowledge. It is fair to
say, however, that most management styles emphasized rigorous
work and stringency of discipline.
In the late 1800's and early 1900's, the scientific
management movement came into vogue under the driving force
of Frederick W. Taylor, whose views were strongly influenced
by the Protestant ethic. His emphasis was on task
management; the ascertaining scientifically of the most
efficient way of doing each task, standardizing that method,
and requiring workers to use it. By this means, productivity
could be increased and higher earnings would be achieved.
Taylor viewed the worker as an adjunct to the machine, and
assumed that workers would be motivated by greater economic
rewards
:
"The management must ... recognize the broad fact that
workmen will not submit to this more rigid standardization
and will not work extra hard, unless they receive extra pay
for doing it" [Ref . 3]
.
This view was consistent with the concept of "economic
man" which was popularly accepted in the early 1900's.
Economic man was defined as:
"a rational creature who uses his reason primarily to
calculate how much satisfaction he may obtain from the
smallest amount of effort, or when necessary, how much
discomfort he can avoid. 'Satisfaction' does not mean
pride in one's job ...; it refers only to money.
Similarly, 'discomfort' refers, to failing in one's task
..., but solely to the fear of starvation" [Ref. 4],
Pay first became a prominent research subject during the
scientific management era. Most of the first studies were
18

concerned with measuring the effectiveness of the various
piece rate incentive plans that were introduced. From 1900
to the early 1930's, time study and incentive plans became a
way of life in most companies. Pragmatically, scientific
management was successful in the effort to increase effi-
ciency and productivity; however, growing criticism was
leveled at Taylor's approach for treating workers like cogs
in a well-oiled machine and for eliminating any humanistic
practices in industry.
Up to this time, money was viewed as an effective
motivator. However, doubt was first cast on this belief with
the research of Elton Mayo in a series of studies conducted
at the Hawthorne Plant of the Western Electric Company
between 1927 and 1932. Mayo had been called in by the
company to determine the effects on productivity of working
conditions, length of working day, frequency and length of
rest periods, and other variables relating to the physical
environment. He found that production increased regardless
of variations in these conditions. Even more surprising,
production continued to increase after the employees were
returned to the original conditions with longer working
hours, without rest periods, and with poor surroundings.
Another phase of Mayo's research examined the group
behavior of workers. He found that the informal work group
established production norms that were often in conflict with
19

those set by management. Even though the workers were paid
on a group piecework incentive plan, the workers restricted
output and thereby reduced possible earnings.
Mayo's experiments weakened the prevailing belief that
work place illumination, work conditions, fatigue, and other
physical and physiological variables, along with strong
monetary incentives, were the primary factors influencing
productivity. Social and psychological factors also began to
be seen as important in employee satisfaction and output. In
fact, results of the Hawthorne experiments were interpreted
as conclusive proof that other factors were more important in
motivating performance than pay.
The Hawthorne experiments ushered in the human relations
movement in industry which, in effect, put the human element
back into the organization. This era paved the way for the
more modern behavioral scientists with their theories of
motivation, performance and rewards, and their emphasis on
human values.
B. THE MOTIVATION TO WORK
One of the most difficult and controversial tasks for
behavioral scientists is to explain the urge behind
behavior; to identify the motive that prompts a person to act
in a certain way. A number of theories have been developed
and researched to explain motivation, and evidence has been
gathered to support each of the major theories.
20

The need-hierarchy concept was developed by Abraham
Maslow in the 1940's. He identified five levels of needs
which served a motivators: (1) physiological, (2) safety and
security, (3) social, (4) esteem, and (5) self-actualization
(Figure 1). These needs are arranged in hierarchical levels,
showing that lower level needs must be met before higher
level needs can motivate. According to Maslow, a satisfied
need ceases to motivate behavior. In Maslow's theory, pay is
viewed as a benefit which satisfies a lower level need such
as physiological (i.e., purchase of food to satisfy hunger)
or security (i.e., exchange of money for a place to live).
However, opponents of his theory argue that pay is also an
indication of esteem and a recognition of accomplishments
which lead to self-actualization.
Self aciuahzation
Achieving the potential within oneself,
mdximum self oevelopment. creativity,
and selt expression
Eiteew
Self respect, respect of others and eqo or
status needs
Sucial
Associations wvith others, belonainq to groups.
and giving and receiving friendship and affection
Security
Protection against danger, threat, and
oeprivation
Phvsiological
Hunger, thirst, the activity sleep
cycle, sex, ana evacuation
Figure 1. Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs
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In the late 1950's, Frederick Herzberg developed his two-
factor theory of motivation which states that there are two
basic sets of factors which explain employee behavior
—
motivation factors and hygiene factors. Motivation factors
are those whose fulfillment leads to job satisfaction and
hence have the power to motivate good job performance. They
include recognition, responsibility, advancement, and
achievement. Hygiene factors, on the other hand, are
important in preventing job dissatisfaction but do not play
an important role in motivating employees. Pay is not viewed
as a motivator; it is rather seen as a hygiene factor along
with company policy, working conditions, and interpersonal
relations.
Another researcher, David McClelland, suggests that
motivation comes from the need to achieve, which is fostered
by Western culture. According to McClelland, much of our
society has come to think in terms of getting ahead,
achieving, or "being somebody." The need to succeed is the
motivator, not pay.
Douglas McGregor developed two alternative views of
employee behavior called "Theory X" and "Theory Y". The
assumptions of Theory Y are that people are not lazy, that
they find work as necessary as play, and that by their very
nature they are motivated to make positive contributions.
Theory X, on the other hand, says that people dislike work.
22

have little ambition, and must be coerced or threatened with
punishment in order to be motivated to put forth effort.
Practicing managers are perhaps most familiar with what
Professor W. R. Bishop of the Naval Postgraduate School calls
the "Thom McAn" method of motivation, also referred to as the
"kick in the pants" theory. Literal application of the term
is rarely used since it is inelegant and might result in
negative feedback (i.e., the employee might kick back).
However, the figurative application is often utilized in
today's environment, either in a pull (carrot) or push
(stick) mode. According to this theory, salary is seen as a
frontal kick—force is exerted as a "pull" rather than a
"push". Herzberg has suggested that while this leads to
movement, it does not create motivation. "When I want him to
move again, what must I do? I must kick [pull] him again
.... It is only when he has his own generator that we can
talk about motivation [Ref. 5],
In summary, the majority of theories that focus on
specific needs or conditions suggest that money will not be a
motivating factor. People want to contribute because of an
innate or learned drive, and thus there is no need to use pay
increases as a means to improve performance.
However, it is obvious to anyone in the working
environment that employees often leave one job for another
that pays more money. Process theories of motivation attempt
23

to shed some insight into this behavior by examining
the interrelationship of variables such as drive,
reinforcement, and expectancy. The most predominant process
theories are equity theory, goal-setting theory, and
expectancy theory.
The essence of equity theory is that employees will make
comparisons of their efforts and rewards with those of others
in similar work conditions. J. S. Adams, who developed the
theory, defines inequity as follows:
Inequity exists for Person whenever he perceives that the
ratio of his outcomes to inputs and the ratio of Other's
outcomes to Other's inputs are unequal. This may happen
either (a) when he and Other are in a direct exchange
relationship or (b) when both are in an exchange
relationship with a third party and Person compares himself
to Other [Ref . 6] .
Outcomes in the work environment include pay, fringe
benefits, and status. Inputs include effort, educational
level, skills, and general qualifications for the job.
Equity theory says that the perception of inequity will
create tension in an individual thereby motivating him to
either increase his efforts to get benefits that will restore
equity, or to reduce efforts and outputs.
The comparison process leads to one of three outcomes
—
satisfaction, dissatisfaction and guilt or discomfort
(Figure 2).
Feelings of overreward are reduced by either (1) working
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Figure 2. Model of the Determinants of Pay Satisfaction
(E. E. Lawler)
and/or of the pay that others receive. However, there is
evidence that people are more inclined to increase their
perception of their inputs than to increase their actual
inputs [Ref. 7]. Feelings of underreward do not seem to work
the same way (i.e., perceptions are not altered). In these
cases, feelings of dissatisfaction can usually be reduced
only by receiving higher pay or a new job. Failing that, the
most obvious alternative is to reduce one's effort.
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A good example of real-life equity situations occurred in
the professional sports environment of the 1970's. Many
established "stars" were playing out their options so they
could renegotiate their contracts and/or change teams. In
doing so, they were responding to the long-term, no-cut
contracts given to some "superstars", especially those who
hadn't proven themselves over the long run. In February
1977, Slick Watts of the Seattle Supersonics, who had led the
league the year before in steals and assists, said:
"I know most people think I'm taking good money, and I am.
[Reportedly $70,000 plus bonuses, with increases to
$80,000 and $90,000 for the next two years] But, I bring
people into the Coliseum. ... That helps the Sonics. Sam
is getting compensated, Russ is getting compensated. Tommy
is getting very well compensated.... Me and Norwood get
the same salary and he's been in this league a long time
and he's on his last legs. There's a lot of guys in this
league making over a hundred grand a year and they don't
even get off the bench" [Ref. 8],
The goal-setting theory postulated by Edwin Locke, a
behavioral scientist at the University of Maryland, says that
the setting of specific goals is more conducive to goal
accomplishment than monetary incentives [Ref. 9]. When goals
are set and accepted, performance levels are as high as when
monetary rewards are provided. According to this theory, the
intrinsic motivation to accomplish goals is the driving
force. Opponents of Locke's theory argue that he dealt with
small incentives that had little potential to motivate, and
that in fact, larger monetary incentives do result in better
performance when goal levels are constant.
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Expectancy theory postulates that motivation is a
function of three factors—effort, performance/achievement,
and reward. For individuals to be motivated, they must
believe or expect that additional effort will result in
higher performance as measured by the organization, and that
higher performance will result in rewards which the
individual values. An additional factor is the belief or
expectancy of an individual that he or she is in fact able to
succeed in achieving the effort. Figure 3 shows a simplified
version of the expectancy-theory model.
Ability
Performance -^ Outcomes (Rewards)
An individual's motivation is a function of:
(1) Effort/Performance Expectancy ("Will my Effort Result in
Higher Performance?")
(2) Performance/Outcome Expectancy ("Will the Performance
Lead to Rewards?")
(3) Attractiveness of Outcomes ("Do I Want the Reward?")
Figure 3. The Expectancy Theory Model
(Based on E.E. Lawler's Model)
According to this theory, if an employee wants some
reward but believes that in spite of all his efforts there is
nothing he can do in the current organization that will
27

result in geeting it, he will cease to be motivated by the
possibility of that reward.
C. RECENT RESEARCH
The heated debate among researchers as to the value of
money in motivation has continued into the present time.
Some say that money not only motivates, but it motivates
best. Others argue that money is only a means of exchanging
social utilities in a modern society and, as such, cannot be
relied on as a motivator.
In reviewing the research in the area of compensation, it
becomes clear that very little is really known about the
incentive value of money. Most of the published data are
exclusively psychological (e.g., Herzberg), while studies
that include "hard" data often do not indue psychological or
perceptual data. The most common interpretation from studies
that have tried to bridge the gap between hard data and
perceptual data is that satisfaction concerning pay is more a
function of individual goals and backgrounds than of absolute
levels of pay. For example, Gellerman places great
importance on the symbolic value of money for producing
motivation and reducing dissatisfaction. In describing the
value of a pay "increment", he says, "Whatever symbolism
money has for the individual and whatever presumptions and
illusions he has about how added income would affect the way
28

he lives, are as much a part of the increment for him as is
the money itself" [Ref. 10].
Wernimont and Fitzpatrick's (1972) research supports the
notion that money has a great deal of symbolic value and
means different things to different types of people. Their
work suggests that as an incentive, money is also valued very
differently by different groups and is, therefore, not a
universally motivating force [Ref. 11].
The research of Hinrichs (1969) found that an
individual's current level of earnings is one of the most
powerful variables affecting how he or she perceives a given
salary increase [Ref. 12]. His findings suggest that
individuals with characteristics normally associated with
higher levels of earnings potential (e.g., college education,
youth, males) will tend to have higher expectations with
regard to salary than will others and will in turn have a
higher threshold of what is perceived as an acceptable salary
increase. This has similarities to the expectancy theory
with its individual perceptions of "where I am now" and
"where I should be based on my education, age, skills, etc."
Some studies support Herzberg's view of money as a
hygiene factor. One survey revealed that out of 18 job-
related factors, salary was ranked twelfth in importance by
those surveyed, 60% of whom were managers and supervisors
[Ref. 13]. Another survey of middle managers at 2,867
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companies supports the premise that salary increases
generally fail to motivate employees [Ref. 14].
However, Gellerman notes that primarily because of such
studies and the conclusions drawn by behavioral scientists
many people have wrongly determined that money has little or
no motivating power. He contends that money would be an
effective motivator if its distribution were properly
administered. Gellerman also argues that if pay is to
motivate performance, very large amounts of pay must be
involved. Additionally, he points out that these large
amounts of pay must be perceived to be dependent upon
performance [Ref. 15].
Lawler, among others, contends that when certain
specified conditions exist, pay and other rewards have been
demonstrated to motivate performance. These necessary
conditions are that "important rewards must be perceived to
be tied in a timely fashion to effective performance"
[Ref. 16].
This view is supported by other researcgers, such as
Atkinson and Reitman, who showed that the offer of a
financial incentive led to increased job performance in
general but especially among people who were low on
achievement motivation. They found that people who were high
on achievement motivation worked hard without the offer of a
financial reward [Ref. 17].
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Locke and Bryan present data from various studies
concerning the effects of monetary incentives. Overall,
their data suggest that offering financial incentives will
increase performance when rewards are tied to performance
[Ref. 18].
The importance of employees' perceptions of the
relationship between pay and performance was stressed by
Vroom [Ref. 19] as a factor in work motivation. Related to
this is the work of McGeoch and Irion [Ref. 20], who found
that rewards are most effective when employees perceive a
direct connection between the behavior and the reward. How
infrequently this happens is highlighted by the results of a
national survey of randomly selected employed individuals.
Only 27.2% of those surveyed said they were likely to get a
bonus or pay raise if they did their job well [Ref. 21].
There are several case studies that have been concerned
with the degree to which blue-collar employees see their pay
being determined by job performance. In general, the data
indicate that many of the pay plans that are called incentive
plans by management are not seen as incentive plans by
employees. Further, data show that if employees do not
consider the basis upon which pay is determined to be
legitimate, they exhibit resistance that often leads to the
failure of the programs. It seems obvious that when
employees feel there is little relationship between what they
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achieve and the salary they get, then wages will have little,
if any, motivational value.
However, this should not suggest that all an organization
has to do is effectively relate pay to performance in order
to achieve increased motivation and productivity. Other
things (e.g., developing a good measure of performance) are
just as important, and are very difficult to do. The
complexity of the issues involved has led some researchers to
conclude that it is not worth trying to relate pay rewards to
performance.
The real conclusion that comes out of the numerous and
conflicting studies is that people differ substantially and
in meaningful ways about what is important to them. Some
individuals value and are highly motivated by entrinsic
rewards (e.g., pay, additional holiday time, more perks);
others with different personal and background characteristics
will value intrinsic rewards (e.g., an interesting job) more
highly. In the author's view, the studies merely reinforce
Maslow's theory. In some cases an individual will be
motivated by money and the security or physiological needs it
can meet; however, when those needs are met, money will cease
to be a motivating force. Self-actualization will inherently




A. PRIVATE SECTOR EXPERIENCE
1. Pay for Performance Systems
Systems that tie pay to performance have been in
existence in private industry for several years and have
assumed various forms. These forms include gain sharing,
bonuses, merit pay, and combination plans.
a. Gain Sharing
Gain sharing involves paying a bonus to employees
based upon improvements in the operating results of an
organization. A formula is designed to generate a bonus pool
which is divided up among the members of the plan.- Gain
sharing plans have been in existence for up to 30-40 years
and include the Scanlon Plan, profit sharing, and the Lincoln
Electric Plan.
(1) The Scanlon Plan . The Scanlon Plan is a
common sharing between management and employees of problems,
goals, and ideas, as well as economic gains. Monetary payouts
are distributed as a percentage of an employee's gross
income. Two of the companies that have used this plan are
Parker Pen Company and the Atwood Vacuum Machine Company.
Research of. these and other companies using the Scanlon Plan
indicates that it is successful in contributing to organiza-
tional effectiveness at least 50% of the time [Ref. 22].
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(2) Profit Sharing . Profit sharing involves
sharing the profits of the company with its employees.
Usually, however, these plans defer the payments until
retirement and are, therefore, not true incentive plans.
Others combine a partial payout with deferment of the rest.
According to one study [Ref. 23], over 350,000 firms in the
United States have some form of profit sharing. However, in
most companies, profits are so far beyond the direct
influence of employees that profit-based bonuses are simply
not likely to be, nor used as, effective motivators.
(3) The Lincoln Electric Plan . Under this plan,
a bonus pool is determined based on company performance but
is distributed to based on their individual performance.
This plan is actually a combination of gain-sharing and merit
pay.
b. Bonuses
Bonuses are special lump-sum payments made to
individual employees for meeting goals or performing at a
certain level. In most companies, bonuses are used in
combination with across-the-board base pay increases that
reflect changes in market conditions. The principle behind
bonuses is the same as that behind merit pay; the systems
differ in that bonuses do not increase base pay and are




Salary adjustments based on the performance or
achievements of individuals are referred to as merit pay.
Most of these salary increases reflect changes in both market
conditions and in performance. In periods of high inflation,
much of the increase may be just an adjustment for changes in
the market, leaving the "merit" portion rather small and
discouraging. The result is often the perception by
employees that there is not much merit in merit pay plans.
The salary increases also are spread out over an annual basis
rather than given as a lump-sum payment. Despite the
drawbacks, a majority of companies use merit pay increases
rather than bonuses or gain-sharing plans. Kaiser Aluminum
uses a merit pay system as well as providing additional lump-
sum bonuses to top performers.
d. Combination Plans
These involve using a combination of the plans
cited above, or using one or more of these in conjunction
with non-merit plans such as regular general wage
adjustments, periodic cost-of-living adjustments, length-of-
service increases, or wage progression schedules. Parts of
AT&T use regular salary increases (up to a control point set
at market value) for satisfactory performers; additional




2. Results of Private Sector Experience
A survey of basic pay policies and practices was
conducted by the Bureau of National Affairs' 1979-1980
Personnel Policies Forum [Ref. 24]. One hundred eighty- three
executives, mostly from manufacturing firms, responded to the
survey. Other respondents represented educational
institutions, hospitals, government agencies, and non-
manufacturing business firms. The survey found that increases
in basic pay rates were usually made through merit pay
adjustments. Plant/service workers, who normally received
increases through wage progression schedules or length-of-
service provisions. Formal wage progression schedules were
also established for supervisors/managers in 30% of the
responding firms. Another thirty percent indicated that they
also provided regular, across-the-board increases for
supervisors/managers. Three major problems, all relating to
pay for performance, were cited by these 183 employers:
1. Trying to maintain a pay adjustment program based
strictly on merit in a period of high inflation. The size
of the increases falls short, in most cases, to the cost of
living.
2. Salary compression among middle managers; i.e., the
perceived shrinking of middle managers' salaries relative
to the faster-rising pay rates of nonmanagement employees.
Recommendations from the firms to alleviate this included
making periodic "equity adjustments" and providing managers
the same general increases given to nonmanagement.
3. Difficulties in performance review for purposes of
merit increases. Objectivity, accuracy, and timeliness




It is precisely because of these types of problems
that some private corporations are moving away from pay for
performance. There is, in fact, almost as much literature on
the failure of incentive systems in private industry as there
is on their success. Some researchers, such as Frederick
Thayer [Ref. 25] therefore dispute the assumption of the
Civil Service Reform Act that business organizations have
superior incentive systems which should be imitated by the
Government. They argue that there is no clear evidence that
private sector organizations are particularly effective in
making performance-based pay plans work.
For example, one study of a group of research
organizations found that only 67% of the scientists said
merit pay existed despite the fact that management claimed it
was present in all the organizations [Ref. 26].
In another instance, a survey of the 500 largest
industrial firms in the U.S.— the Fortune 500—examined the
relationship between salaries and job performance [Ref. 27].
It found that although 93% of the firms claimed to have a
merit system that advanced salaries on the basis of job
performance, less than 19% in fact attempted to use some form
of a performance-oriented appraisal device. Without this
type of device, a company is simply not able to relate job




The Federal Merit Pay System uses a performance-
oriented objective-setting process based on the practices
claimed to be used in the private sector. However, the
management-by-objectives system has enjoyed only limited
success in industry. In another survey of Fortune 500 compa-
nies [Ref. 28], 45% of the 403 respondents said that they had
an MBO program; of these programs, only 19% were rated as
successful. The major problems centered around the difficulty
in defining objectives with any degree of precision and in
obtaining measurable criteria. Other major complaints
concerned an excess of paperwork and the difficulty of
stating quantitative goals for all aspects of the job.
The American Management Association's magazine.
Personnel
,
queried its readers with regard to the impact of
inflation and small merit increases on motivation of
employees. Of 24 respondents, 14 felt that pay increases
drawn from a merit increase budget that is only 1-2 percent
above the inflation rate would have very little or no
positive motivational effect. Only one respondent said that
such a budget would have no negative effect. David S.
Novick, manager of personnel administration at Nestle
Company, Inc., said,
"When employers award increases that don't keep pace
with cost-of-living factors, management's credibility is
severely strained and its ability to 'motivate' has to be
hampered. A good many salaried employees are distracted
and frustrated by their inability to keep up, even when
they turn in good job performances" [Ref. 29].
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when asked if a small pay increase could positively
affect otherwise highly motivated employees, 16 said either
that it could not or that it would have a negative effect.
For example, Bruce Ellig, vice-president of compensation for
Pfizer, Inc., said that a "small merit increase will
negatively affect otherwise highly motivated performers.
Most will recognize they have been shortchanged by the
company; they have received an inadequate reward for the
level of contribution they have made" [Ref. 30], Taking
another viewpoint, David Novick of Nestle said that "people
value the recognition that goes along with even a minimal
increase, if others are getting smaller amounts or nothing.
Thus there is still some benefit ...." [Ref. 31].
3. Summary
It is evident, then, that private sector experience
with pay-for-performance systems has met with mixed results.
Although many companies believe in the concept, they appear
to be overcome by problems of implementation.
B. PUBLIC SECTOR EXPERIENCE
1. Merit Pay in 1980; The First Year
Eight federal agencies implemented merit pay in
October 1980, one year earlier than the rest of the
Government. Results of the payouts were as follows [Ref. 32]:
- Merit pay employees rated "Satisfactory" received an
average increase of 14.38%; those rated "Exceeds
Expectations", 12.76%; and those rated "Outstanding",
39

10.60%. This compares with increases of between 9.1%
through 12.3% for GS employees , depending on their
eligibility for within-grade increases.
- More than 93% of the merit pay employees received payouts
equal to or greater than the full comparability
adjustment of 9.1%.
However, in a subsequent study of merit pay, the General
Accounting Office (GAO) found that OPM's method for computing
merit pay funds was faulty and resulted in increased costs of
about $1 million more than was warranted. This added almost
1.2% to the average merit pay increase for 1980 [Ref. 33].
The merit pay experience in 1980 revealed a number of
problems in the implementation process. Specifically,
- The agencies experienced difficulty with performance
standard-setting. Typical problems included the lack of
employee participation in setting standards and the use
of standards which were overly vague, overly specific,
overly quantitative, or obsolete. The results of these
problems was that supervisors found it difficult to rate
accurately, and a number of employees felt their
standards were not rational.
- Rating distributions were for the most part negatively
skewed (i.e., a disproportionate number of people were
rated in the top two categories). Consequently, some
managers requested that performance ratings be changed to
more closely approximate a bell curve, a practice
expressly forbidden by 0PM. Not surprisingly, these
cases generated friction and discontent among employees,
who felt the merit pay system was unfair and that ratings
were based on favoritism rather than on performance.
- Performance appraisal systems were not completely or
adequately pretested before being used to make merit pay
determinations. Performance appraisal experts in private
industry say that good performance appraisal systems take
from 3-5 years to develop, with extensive pretesting and
evaluation. Pretesting is considered to be extremely
valuable in that it gives managers the opportunity to
refine their appraisal skills prior to making pay
decisions and identifies the "bugs" that are inevitable
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in any new program. As a result of inadequate or absent
pretests, some agencies had problems which affected the
integrity of their merit pay systems.
- The guidelines provided by 0PM concerning who is and who
isn't covered by merit pay were inadequate. Most of the
problems centered around the definition of "management
official" (i.e., the determination of whether an employee
is in a policy making role that requires a good deal of
judgment). As a result of the unclear guidelines, some
employees who were not actually management officials were
included in the merit pay, while some who were management
officials were not included.
- The technical assistance given by 0PM to the agencies was
neither timely or adequate. When the eight agencies were
developing their merit pay systems for 1980
implementation, 0PM inexperienced technical staff was at
the start of its own learning curve and was just
beginning to issue guidelines relative to merit pay. As
a result, agencies were asking for guidelines which had
not been formulated or even considered by 0PM, and
assistance was limited.
Results of the GAO study were summarized in the
Comptroller General's Report to Congress which concluded:
concluded:
"We do not believe 0PM has provided the leadership,
guidelines, and assistance needed to assure quality pay-
f or-performance programs are implemented. ... We
believe OPM's lack of commitment and unwillingness to
undertake a dynamic leadership role has raised serious
doubts about the success of the merit pay program ..."
[Ref. 34].
The Comptroller General also recommended to the
President that agencies be excluded from the October 1981
mandatory merit pay implementation date if they had not pre-




2. Merit Pay in 1981; The Second Year
In October 1981, the remaining 90-odd Federal
agencies covered by merit pay implemented their systems as
required by law. However, because of a Comptroller General
decision of 8 September 1981 (Appendix C) , merit pay for 1981
did not operate as intended by the CSRA. The Comptroller
General's decision touched off a controversy between GAO and
0PM that was not resolved until just before payouts were
made. The controversy surrounded an interpretation of the
statute relative to the determination of funds available for
the merit pay program. The merit pay provisions of the CSRA
stipulated that the merit pay system would cost no more than
the pre-merit pay system. However, GAO found that "the
method used by 0PM to calculate amounts available for merit
pay payouts by agencies does not conform to the requirements
of the Act" [Ref. 35]. Specifically, the GAO audit staff
found that the method used by 0PM to calculate merit pay
funds would "make available to all executive agencies,
collectively, approximately $58 - $74 million dollars more
every year for merit pay expenditures would have been
expended under the pre-merit pay system" [Ref. 36].
Accordingly, ruled the Comptroller General, "0PM should take
immediate action to revise its merit pay implementation plan
to bring it into compliance with this restriction" [Ref. 37].
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Although 0PM disputed the GAO findings, the
Comptroller General's decision stood. Since all this
occurred less than a month before the full implementation of
merit pay in October 1981, 0PM was now obviously in a time
bind and felt its best recourse was to provide merit pay
employees with the full portion of the general schedule
comparability increase (4.8%). The funds for merit
adjustments came from a vastly reduced pool of money
calculated from estimates of within-grade and quality step
increases which would have been given if GM employees had
remained under the general schedule. Merit adjustments for
1981 therefore were quite small, with the majority of
individuals (65%) receiving from .7 to 2.1%. In comparison,
GS employees received from to 3% over and above the 4.8
comparability increase, depending on their eligibility for
within-grade increases.
It was painfully clear to merit pay employees what
had happened: GM employees who would have received a within-
grade increase under the General Schedule "lost" money, while
those who would not have been eligible for a within-grade
increase "won" more than they would have. Additional
problems with the merit pay system surfaced:
- In January 1981, 0PM issued a legal opinion prohibiting
agencies from extrapolating a performance rating more
than one level above or below a defined standard. This
meant that agencies with five performance levels had to
have written standards defined for each employee for at
least two levels. Unfortunately, 0PM had already
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approved the merit pay performance appraisal plans for 33
agencies who intended to operate with a single
performance standard against five rating levels. The
plansof these agencies were now in violation of the law.
0PM gave these agencies the alternative of redefining
standards in the midst of the October 1981 appraisal
cycle or waiting until the next year (1981) to bring
their plans into compliance. Many agencies chose to wait
until 1981 to comply and thus paid merit pay increases
based upon illegal performance appraisals, thereby
leaving themselves vulnerable to lawsuits over any
personnel decisions resulting from the appraisals.
- Pretesting of systems was again seen to be inadequate or
simply not done GAO audit staff found that the majority
of agencies weren't conducting pre-tests because agency
officials said they didn't have enough time before the
October 1981 deadline.
- Until late 1981, 0PM had an unwritten but strict policy
requiring agency merit pay plans to grant the highest
level performers two to four times as much merit pay than
the lowest of the fully satisfactory level performers.
Then, at an emergency session of an official interagency
group, 0PM encouraged agencies to adjust their plans to
grant the highest performers a 5-6 times larger portion
of the merit pay fund than the lowest fully satisfactory
performers. Any pre-testing that had been done, and more
than a year's worth of planning, was suddenly worthless.
Agency personnel officers reacted with confusion and
bitterness, rumors flourished, and the merit pay system
lost much of whatever credibility it had.
- In spite of all the manipulations, merit pay for 1981 did
not result in pay distinctions between performance
levels. The end result yielded pay variances of less than
1% between top and average performers [Ref. 38].
The Defense Communications Agency, a major Defense
Agency, conducted a survey among its 420 merit pay employees
immediately after the 1981 payout [Ref. 39]. Only 24% said
the payouts were fair; and 70% said they did not perform
better because of the merit pay system. Over 70% objected to
the way in which the merit pay system affected them
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personally or the way in which it was implemented. Comments
included:
- "I would have gotten a lot more with my normal step
increase. It's going to take me twice as long to get to
the same salary level as I would have with normal step
increases.
"
- "This whole system is the most demoralizing thing to come
along and is making some of us think about leaving the
government.
"
- "True merit workers were not rewarded as promised. Many
people are still not sure as to what program they belong
under, GS or GM."
- "There is not one positive feature which can be found
about this program. If anything, [it] ... should serve
as a prime disincentive for doing quality work."
Comments from executive level individuals at DCA, who
are not covered by the merit pay system, include:
- "Almost everyone involved is very dissatisfied. It is
perceived that rating criteria were not consistently
applied ... This has resulted in dissatisfaction of both
rate and rater, damaged their relationship, and caused a
significant loss of respect for ... management."
- "... the Merit Pay System operation in [1981] was
generally unsatisfactory."
3. Merit Pay 1982: The Third Year
Merit pay for 1982 represented the first year that
merit pay was fully operatiing as intended by the law. All
agencies covered by merit pay had made the conversion to that
system, and differences between 0PM and GAO had been ironed
out, thereby insuring that funding for the system was




- Ninety-one percent (91%) of merit pay employees received
payouts equal to or greater than the full comparability
adjustment of 4%.
- The majority of merit pay employees (62%) received
payouts between 4.1 and 7.0%. A smaller number (26%)
received payouts in the range of 7.1 to 10%.
- In comparison. General Schedule employees received
increases of between 4 and 7%, depending on their
eligibility for within-grade increases. Those employees
who performed exceptionally well and received quality
step increases received approximately 3% more; for some,
this represented a total increase of 10%.
Other issues surfaced during this year which raised
additional concern with merit pay:
- Up to 1982, 0PM officials had interpreted the regulations
as forbidding agencies to guarantee a specific portion of
the merit pay fund for a certain level of performance.
There was significant resistance to this interpretation,
since many agencies wanted to guarantee full
comparability to merit pay employees who performed at the
"satisfactory" level. In 1982, however, the same 0PM
officials made a complete about-face by inviting agencies
to revise merit pay plans to target full comparability to
satisfactory performers. This new policy was welcomed by
agencies; however, new doubts about OPM's knowledge and
guidance were raised since the 180o turn in
interpretation occurred without any related change to the
regulations. At best, OPM looked "wishy-washy"; at
worst, incompetent.
- In 1982, pay distinctions were only slightly better than
in 1981. The pay variances between top and average
performers was only about 3%— the value of a quality step
increase under the longevity-based GS system.
After the 1982 payouts, a merit pay employee survey
was once more conducted at the Defense Communications Agency
[Ref. 41]. The bottom line was that while there was some
greater acceptance of the merit pay system, employee
attitudes remained for the most part negative. Additionally,
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the surveyed showed that the system did not meet the major
objective of providing an incentive for better performance by
merit pay employees. Employee comments included the
following:
- "The merit pay system appears to require outstanding
performance for little or no reward— such a system will
not cause performance to improve."
- "This system is a paperwork nightmare yielding no
results.
"
- "I was only marginally better off after an outstanding
[rating] than if I were not under the merit pay—not much
incentive based on merit pay."
- "I strongly approve of the merit pay system in principle.
I find that in its application and administration it is
not meeting its stated objectives, i.e., to motivate and
reward merit pay employees to more efficient and
effective performance."
- "Merit pay is a demotivator due to the extreme amount of
paperwork, the miniscule amount of money at stake, and




With an objective of more closely aligning pay to
productivity, the merit pay system was hailed as the way to
improve the Federal Government's employee compensation
practices. Not only did it not do this, it replaced a
previously stable compensation system with one which was
ineffective. The reasons for the failure encompass both the
general problems inherent in any pay-for-performance system
and the specific problems of implementing merit pay in the
public sector. These problems can be categorized into seven
major areas:
- difficulties in performance evaluation,
- insignificant monetary rewards,
- extraordinarily complex and time-consuming systems,
- inconsistent employee treatment,
- inept 0PM assistance,
- administrative errors, and
- pay inequity.
A. DIFFICULTIES IN PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
One of the most frequent complaints of employees in both
the private and public sectors has been that performance
appraisals are not accurate. In fact, performance
evaluations are generally notorious for being invalid and
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biased. The Federal Government merit pay appraisal system is
no different.
The system requires that performance requirements or
elements be identified, and a standard or measure be defined
against which an employee's performance is evaluated. The
final evaluation serves as the basis for determining the
amount of the merit pay increase. In some jobs, performance
can be accurately measured through time-study methods.
However, most supervisory or managerial jobs do not lend
themselves to this approach, and other techniques must be
used. When the validity of these techniques is in serious
question, as they are, employees do not feel that the
performance appraisal is very accurate, and thus have little
reason to believe that performance and pay are linked. One
researcher notes the inevitable results:
"If the system ... doesn't have adequate performance
appraisal, you find that people develop a wide range of
very different perceptions of what pays off ... If you
interview subordinates in an organization that 'has a merit
pay system' but has poor performance appraisal, you will
find a wide range of opinion about whether the system works
or not, and what it means to get a merit increase. Often
the perceptions are very cynical, they are
counterproductive, and indeed they are really not
motivating anything except what we would properly call
superstitious behavior" [Ref. 42].
Another issue revolves around the inconsistency of
performance standards and appraisals. Employees who
performed essentially the same job, but worked for different
supervisors, invariably had very different standards by which
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their performance was measured. Often one employee would do
little and still receive an "Outstanding"/ while another was
required to go to extraordinary lengths in order to achieve
the same rating. Generally, the latter employee received a
lower rating. As one individual noted, "Disparity of
standards breeds inequity, and therefore distrust and
contempt for the system" [Ref. 43]
A last issue deals with the distribution of performance
ratings. In order to have any meaningful pay distinctions
between the top and average performers, the majority of
performance ratings had to fall at the satisfactory level.
To insure that this happened, some agencies used a forced
distribution scheme, limiting the number of "Outstanding" and
"Highly Successful" ratings. This type of practice was not
publicized since it is expressly forbidden by regulation;
however, employees were aware of it and, not surprisingly,
reacted with bitterness, distrust, and a total lack of belief
in the system.
B. INSIGNIFICANT MONETARY REWARDS
One of the fundamental beliefs of merit pay is that money
can be used to motivate employees. Even the group of
researchers who subscribe to this belief, however, are quick
to point out that to be motivating, salary increases must be
large enough to be perceived as being worth the extra effort.
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No one figure has been identified by researchers as being
"large enough" to motivate, primarily because this figure
changes in times of inflation and is highly dependent on the
individual employee's perceptions. A few researchers contend
that increases must be around 7% to motivate; however,
another says that "if 4 to 5 percent increases are rather
standard anyway, it is doubtful that the potential of 7 will
do much to motivate anyone" [Ref. 44].
The "standard" merit increase for 1982 ranged from 4.1 to
7%. A small number of employees received increases of 10%.
This 3% differential is so small that it is essentially
meaningless in terms of motivation. The incremental input
required to obtain the incremental outcome is generally not
perceived as being worth the effort. As one researcher
notes, "Analogically, the salary differential in an equity
sense is probably equivalent to telling a 17-year old that if
the finishes high school he'll get a new car, but if he
finishes high school with a B-plus average, he'll also
receive a tape deck for that new car" [Ref. 45].
A more basic problem is that merit pay fails to take into
account the results of numerous studies which indicate that
money has little value as a motivator and that if individuals
are already motivated to perform because of innate or learned
drives. Some people point out that if performance is a result
of ability plus effort, and if motivation is already present.
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the differences in performance are a function of differences
in ability. Pay for performance systems, therefore, reward
differential ability rather than differential motivation.
C. EXTRAORDINARY COMPLEX AND TIME-CONSUMING SYSTEMS
The literature on designing incentive systems emphasizes
the importance of keeping these systems simple. Designers of
pay for performance plans are told to make the link between
performance and pay clear and obvious, and to avoid complex
bonus pools or combinations of numerous interrelated factors.
The Federal merit pay system, however, is immersed in
complexity. One example is the General Services
Administration system entitled "Linking Individual Pay to
Performance (LIPP)." As a former 0PM official said, it
requires a quantitative background just to understand:
"A set of adjustable mathematical formulas can be
derived to calculate an employee's total salary increase
once the comparability adjustment, distribution of
performance ratings, and amount in the merit pay fund for a
particular pool is known .... Employees will be able to
estimate their salary increases from the LIPP Scale by
finding their current salary (before the comparability
adjustment) on the horizontal axis, following that salary
up to their performance curve and then left to the vertical
axis, where they will find their new salaries (just after
the comparability adjustment). The point at which each
performance curve crosses the comparability line marks the
performance level salary ceiling for that performance
level" [Ref. 46].
The cost of administering these complex merit pay systems
has been estimated by an economist at $1 Billion [Ref. 47].
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Taxpayers would no doubt be upset over the added administra-
tive cost of the merit pay program if they knew that the
payouts made to merit pay employees were generally comparable
to the very simple GS system.
People outside the public sector generally see the merit
pay system and its complexities as being ludicrous. One
merit pay employee authored a paper which proposed to use a
compensation system for baseball players which was based on
the Federal Government's merit pay system. When submitted to
the Harvard Business Review, the article was slotted for
publication as a satirical piece. Upon being told that the
article was serious and that the Government was in fact using
such a system, the piece was scrapped for publication. The
system it proposed just could not be taken seriously by the
editors.
Not only is the system overly complex, it is too time-
consuming. Prior to merit pay, performance appraisals did
not require written standards, and only required extensive
documentation if the rating was "Outstanding" or
"Unsatisfactory". The merit pay system represented a quantum
leap in paperwork, requiring written standards as well as
extensive written justification for all employee performance
ratings. The 1981 GAO Report to the Congress states in part
that "one reason that the Government has not been successful
in attempting to base pay on performance was that too much
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managerial time was needed to document performance
distinctions among employees" [Ref. 48].
D. INCONSISTENT EMPLOYEE TREATMENT
Inconsistencies in the treatment of employees were
apparent from the beginning, when decisions on merit pay
coverage were made. Some agencies identified virtually all
their GS-13, 14 and 15 employees as supervisors or management
officials and thus to be covered under merit pay, while other
agencies were much narrower in their interpretations. This
resulted in cases where employees performing essentially the
same jobs but at separate agencies were treated differently
—
one group under merit pay, the other remaining under the old
GS system.
Payouts among comparable employees also varied from one
agency to another. A good deal of these differences stemmed
from the fact that merit pay design was decentralized and
that, therefore, different agencies had very different merit
pay plans. An employee's payout could vary by as much as 10%
depending upon the merit pay plan that was utilized. Besides
the obvious problems in pay equity, this caused difficulties
when employees transferred from one agency to another.
Even within the same agency, employees at the same grade
level and with the same performance rating could receive
different pay increases. Due to peculiarities in the
allotment of merit pay funds, an employee placed in a unit
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comprised mainly of individuals at the top end of their pay
ranges would receive a smaller increase than a comparable
employee in a unit comprised mainly of employees at the lower
end of the pay range. Moreover, a "Satisfactory" employee in
a unit of "outstanding" employees received far less than a
"Satisfactory" employee of the same grade in a unit of
employees with "Satisfactory" ratings. Needless to say, this
generated a great deal of comparison and dissatisfaction.
E. INEPT 0PM ASSISTANCE
The 0PM staff members from whom agencies expected to
obtain guidance and assistance were themselves inexperienced
in the area of pay for performance and unsure of the method
in which it should be implemented in the Federal Government.
Agencies calling 0PM for assistance generally found that the
guidance given was either inadequate or erroneous. With no
definitive stand on the issues, different offices within 0PM
often provided conflicting guidance or regulatory
interpretations leaving agencies at a loss when trying to
design their individual merit pay plans.
The various agency merit pay plans had to be approved by
0PM prior to implementation. 0PM placed few regulatory
requirements on the design of merit pay plans, preferring
instead to take a decentralized and nonprescriptive approach
in order to give agencies flexibility in designing their
systems. However, agencies soon discovered that unless their
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plans conformed to certain unstated preferences of some 0PM
officials, disapproval was likely. It was not unusual for
agencies to submit merit pay plans that had the unofficial
blessing of 0PM staffers, only to find that the plan was
disapproved by a higher level official who had an entirely
different concept of merit pay. Confusion was the order of
the day, both at agencies and within 0PM, and merit pay was
the casualty. OPM's emphasis was on insuring that agencies
met the October 1981 deadline for merit pay implementation,
rather than on monitoring the quality of merit pay systems
design. The Comptroller General's Report to the Congress
criticized 0PM for providing "late, confusing, and
everchanging policy guidelines and regulations" and stated
that OPM's lack of leadership "raises serious questions about
the merit pay program's chance for success" [Ref. 49].
F. ADMINISTRATIVE ERRORS
The errors made by 0PM in calculating the money available
for the 1981 payouts effectively sabotaged merit pay for the
first year of Government-wide implementation. Moreover, the
reassuring charts prepared by 0PM to convince employees of
the "advantage" of being under merit pay were suddenly
without force, being based on erroneous computations. These
errors, and the last-minute adjustments to correct them,
generated doubts and disillusions about the system in the




Equity theory states that employees will make comparisons
of their efforts and rewards with those of others in similar
work conditions. As stated earlier, merit pay employees at
the same grade and with the same performance rating usually
received different pay increases, due to fund allocation
practices and to the composition of the various merit pay
units. These pay inequities not only caused dissatisfaction,
but also damaged cooperation between organizational units by
stimulating unhealthy competition.
A more predominant source of dissatisfaction arose,
however, when merit pay employees compared their increases
to the amount they would have received under the GS system.
In most cases, the merit pay increase was smaller--
particularly if the merit pay employee would have been
eligible for a within-grade increase under the old system.
This resulted in the inevitable perception that merit pay
individuals, who had attained their supervisory and/or
managerial positions because they were high caliber




The previous chapter examined the reasons that merit pay
failed in the Federal Government. However, most individuals
would agree with a former 0PM official that "Regardless of
the reasons for the billion dollar program's failure,
Congress should demand hard evidence of a meaningful
advantage over the longevity-based general schedule step
system applied before the advent of merit pay and still i use
for employees not covered by merit pay."
After the third year of operation, the politicians who
had approved the system by passing Public Law 95-454 were
indeed viewing it with distrust and demanding an evaluation.
The GAO was commissioned by Congress to conduct a new study
of merit pay, and although they do not expect to complete it
until September 1983, GAO officials state that changes will
have to be made to the current system if it is to succeed.
Congresswoman Rosemary Oakar's Subcommittee on Compensation
and Employee Benefits under the Post Office and Civil Service
is currently awaiting the GAO Report, which will be used in
hearings conducted by the Subcommittee.
Congresswoman Pat Schroeder of the Post Office and Civil
Service Subcommittee feels merit pay is a poorly designed




Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia referred to the system
as a "shambles" and affirmed that the "program has not lived
up to its intent." Although he personally supports the
notion of pay-for-performance. Congressman Wolf believes the
present system lacks sufficient reward to be an incentive and
further that it penalizes merit pay employees in relation to
their GS counterparts. He cites the inequities of payouts
among merit pay employees as another major problem, and
stresses the need to have a system that is consistent
throughout the Government. To that end, Congressman Wolf has
introduced legislation (H.R. 1841) which, in effect, returns
merit pay employees to the longevity-based compensation
system and provides incentive pay in the form of bonuses
(Appendices D and E) . Hearings on the legislation began
during the last week in May 1983. If passed, his system
should save the Government $91 million in payroll costs,
thereby reducing the $5.4 billion payroll costs of the
current merit pay system.
Many government officials and employees believe that
merit pay is good in theory, but that it hasn't worked in
practice. However, if a system can't work in practice, it is
hard to believe that its theoretical basis is sound. The
consensus throughout the Government is that the current merit
pay system does not work. The question is whether it can
ever work even after extensive revisions and pre-testing.
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Probably not. Even a short review of the literature
demonstrates that the fundamental beliefs upon which merit
pay is based are contested by a significant number of the
researcher community (e.g., the use of money as a motivator).
Futhermore, research into comparable private sector pay-for-
performance plans shows that these plans have, for the most
part, been unsuccessful. By modelling itself on these
largely unsuccessful plans, and by further adding a myriad of
regulatory restrictions and procedures, the Government is
destined to have a system which shows even less promise than
those in the private sector.
A total return to the old GS system would seem to be
in order, and would certainly be preferred by the vast
majority of merit pay employees. However, it would no doubt
be impossible politically to do this, since Congress would
have to do an embarrassing about-face. Nonetheless, some
action must be taken to rid the Government of its $1 billion
albatross and return to a sensible and stable compensation
system. The Wolf proposal appears to have the most promise,
both in its simplicity and in its pay-for-performance bonus
provisions. If it does not pass, the Government faces the
monumental task of revising a system which now breeds




TEXT OF THE LAW"
Text of the Law
For the use of readers in understanding the regulations, the text of the relevant laws is
set forth below:
(1) The principal statutory provisions concerning the Merit Pay System appear in chap-
ter 54 of title 5, United States Code, the text of which follows:
Public Law 95-454—October 13, 1978
"Chapter 54—Merit Pay and Cash Awards
"Sec.
"5401. Purpose.
"5402. Merit pay system.




"(a) it is the purpose of this chapter to provide for
—
"(1) a merit pay system which shall
—
"(A) within available funds, recognize and reward quality performance by vary-
ing mem pay adjustments;
"(B) use performance appraisals as the basis for deiermimng merit pay adjust-
ments;
"(C) within available funds, provide for training to improve objectivity and
fairness m the evaluation of performance; and
"(D) regulate the costs of merit pay by establishing appropriate control tech-
niques; and
"(2) a cash award program which shall provide cash awards for superior accom-
plishment and special service.
"(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, this cnapter shall
apply to any supervisor or management official (as defined in paragraphs (10) and (II)
of section 7103 ol this title, respectively) who is in a position which is in GS-13, 14, or 15
of the General Schedule described in section 5104 of this title.
"(2)(A) Upon application under subparagraph (C) of this paragraph, the President
may, in writing, exclude an agency or any unit of an agency from the application of this




"(i) the recent establishment of the agency or unit, or the implementation of a new
program,
"(ii) an emergency situation, or
"(iii) any other situation or circumstance.
"(B) Any exclusion under this paragraph shall not take effect earlier than 30 calendar
days after the President transmits to each House of the Congress a report describing the
agency or unit to be excluded and the reasons therefor.
"(C) An application for exclusion under this paragraph of an agency or any unit of
an agency shall be filed by the head of the agency with the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, and shall set forth reasons why the agency or unit should be excluded from this
chapter. The Office shall review the application and reasons, undertake such other
review as it considers appropriate to determine whether the agency or unit should be
excluded from the coverage of this chapter, and upon completion of its review, recom-
mend to the President whether the agency or unit should be so excluded.
"(D) Any agency or unit which is excluded pursuant to this paragraph shall, insofar
as practicable, make a sustamed effort to eliminate the conditions on which (he exclu-
sion IS based.
"(E) The Office shall periodically review any exclusion from coverage and may at
any time recommend to the President that an exclusion under this paragraph be revoked.
The President may at any time revoke, in writing, any exclusion under this paragraph.
*•§ 5402. Merit Pay System
"(a) In accordance with the purpose set fonh in section 5401(a)(1) of this title, the
Office of Personnel .Management shall establish a merit pay system which shall provide
for a range of basic pay for each grade to which the system applies, which range shall be
limited by the minimum and maximum rates of basic pay payable for each grade under
chapter 53 of this title.
"(b)( 1 ) Under regulations prescribed by the Office, the head of each agency may pro-
vide for increases within the range of basic pay for any employee covered by the merit
pay system.
"(2) Determinations to provide pay increases under this subsection
—
"(A) may take into account individual performance and organizational accom-
plishment, and
"(B) shall be based on factors such as
—
"(i) any improvement in efficiency, productivity, and quality of work or service,
including any significant reduction in paperwork;
'(ii) cost efficiency;
"(iii) timehness of performance; and
"(iv) other indications of the effectiveness, productivity, and quality of perfor-
mance of the employees for whom the employee is responsible;
"(C) shall be subject to review only in accordance with and to the extent provided
by procedures established by the head of the agency; and
"(D) shall be made in accordance with regulations issued by the Office which
relate to the distribution of increases authorized under this subsection.
"(3) For any fiscal year, the head of any agency may exercise authority under para-
graph (1) of this subseaion only to the extent of the funds available for the purpose of
this subsection.
"(4) The funds available for the purpose of this subsection to the head of any agency
for any fiscal year shall be determined before the beginning of the fiscal year by the




"(A) within-grade step increases and quality step increases which would have been
paid under subchapter III of chapter 53 of this title during the fiscal year to the
employees of the agency covered by the merit pay system if the employees were not so
covered; and
"(B) adjustments under section 5305 of this title which would have been paid
under such subchapter during the fiscal year to such employees if the employees were
not so covered, less an amount reflecting the adjustment under subsection (c)(1) of
this section in rates of basic pay payable to the employees for the fiscal year.
"(c)(1) Effective at the beginning of the first applicable pay period commencing on
or after the first day of the month in which an adjustment takes effect under section
5305 of this title, the rate of basic pay for any position under this chapter shall be ad-
justed by an amount equal to the greater of
—
"(A) one-half of the percentage of the adjustment in the annual rate of pay which
corresponds to the percentage generally applicable to positions not covered by the
merit pay system in the same grade as the position; or
"(B) such greater amount of such percentage of adjustment in the annual rate of
pay as may be determined by the Office.
"(2) Any employee whose position is brought under the merit pay system shall, so
long as the employee continues to occupy the position, be entitled to receive basic pay at
a rate of basic pay not less than the rate the employee was receiving when the position
was brought under the merit pay system, plus any subsequent adjustment under para-
graph (1) of this subsection.
"(3) No employee to whom this chapter applies may be paid less than the minimum
rate of basic pay of the grade of the employee's position.
"(d) Under regulations prescribed by the Office, the benefit of advancement through
the range of basic pay for a grade shall be preserved for anv employee covered by the
merit pay system whose continuous service is interrupted m the public interest by service
with the armed forces, or by service in essential non-Government civilian employment
during a period of war or national emergency.
"(e) For the purpose of section 5941 of this title, rates of basic pay of employees
covered by the merit pay system shall be considered rates of basic pay fixed by statute.
"§ 5403. Cash .Award Program
"(a) The head of any agency may pay a cash award to, and incur necessary expenses
for the honoran.' recognition of, any employee covered bv the merit pay sv-stem who
—
"(1) by the employee's suggestion, invention, supenor accomplishment, or other
personal effort, contributes to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of
Government operations or achieves a significant reduction in paperwork; or
"(2) performs a special act or service in the public interest in connection with or
related to the employee's Federal employment.
"(b) The President may pay a cash award to. and incur necessary expenses for the
honorary recognition of, any employee covered by the merit pay system who
—
"(1) by the employee's suggestion, invention, supenor accomplishment, or other
personal effort, contributes to the efficiency, economy, or other improvement of
Government operations or achieves a significant reduction in paperwork; or
"(2) performs an exceptionally meritorious special act or service in the public in-
terest in connection with or related to the employee's Federal employment.
A Presidential cash award may be in addition to an agency cash award under subsection
(a) of this section.
"(c) A cash award to any employee under this section is in addition to the basic pay
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of the employee under section S402 of this title. Acceptance of a cash award under this
section constitutes an agreement that the use by the Government of any idea, method,
or device for which the award is made does not form the basis of any claim of any
nature against the Government by the employee accepting the award, or the employee's
heirs or assigns.
"(d) A cash award to, and expenses for the honorary recognition of, any employee
covered by the merit pay system may be paid from the fund or appropriation available
to the activity primarily benefiting, or the various activities benefiting, from the sugges-
tion, invention, superior accomplishment, or other meritorious effort of the employee.
The head of the agency concerned shall determine the amount to be contributed by each
activity to any agency cash award under subsection (a) of this section. The President
shall determine the amount to be contributed by each activity to a Presidential award
under subsection (b) of this section.
"(c)(1) Except as provided m paragraph (2) of this subsection, a cash award under
this section may not exceed $10,000.
"(2) If the head of an agency certifies to the Office of Personnel Management that
the suggestion, invention, superior accomplishment, or other meritorious effort of an
employee for which a cash award is proposed is highly exceptional and unusually out-
standing, a cash award in excess of SI 0,000 but not in excess of S2S,000 may be awarded
to the employee on the approval of the Office.
"(f) The President or the head of an agency may pay a cash award under this section
notwithstanding the death or separation from the service of an employee, if the sugges-
tion, invention, superior accomplishment, or other meritorious effort of the employee
for which the award is proposed was made or performed while the employee was
covered by the merit pay system.
"§ 5404. Report
"The Office of Personnel Management shall include in each annual report required
by section 1308(a) of this title a repon on the operation of the meni pay system and the
cash award program established under this chapter. The report shall include
—
"(1) an analysis of the cost and effectiveness of the merit pay system and the cash
award program: and
"(2) a statement of the agencies and units excluded from the coverage of this
chapter under section 5401(b)(2) of this title, the reasons for which each exclusion was
made, and whether the exclusion continues to be warranted.
"§5405. Regulations
"The Office of Personnel Management shall prescribe regulations to carry out the
purpose of this chapter.*'.
Incentive A wards Amendments
Sec. 502. (a) Section 4503(1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting
after "operations" the following: "or achieves a significant reduction in paperwork".
(b) Section 4504<1) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by insening after
"operations" the following: "or achieves a significant reduction in paperwork".
Technical and Conformmg Amendments
Sec. 503. (a) Section 4501(2) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking out
": and" and msening in lieu thereof ", but docs not include an employee covered by the
merit pay system established under section 5402 of this title; and".
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(b) Seciion 4502(a) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking out
"$5,000" and insening in lieu thereof "$10,000".
(c) Section 4502(b) of title 5, United States Code, is amended—
(1) by striking out "Civil Service Commission" and insertmg in lieu thereof
"Office of Personnel Management";
(2) by striking out "$5,000" and insening in lieu thereof "$10,000"; and
(3) by striking out "the Commission" and mserting in lieu thereof "the Office".
(d) Section 4506 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking out "Civil
Service Commission may" and inserting in lieu thereof "Office of Personnel Manage-
ment shall".
(e) The second sentence of section 5332(a) of title 5. United States Code, is amended
by inserting after "applies" the following: ". except an emplovee covered by the merit
pay system established under section 5402 of this title,".
(0 Section 5334 of title 5, United States Code (as amended in section 801(a)(3)(G) of
this .\ct). IS amended
—
(1) in paragraph (2) of subsection (c), by inserting ". or for an employee appointed
to a position covered by the merit pay system estabhshed under section 5402 of this
title, any dollar amount." after "step"; and
(2) b> adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(f) In the case of an employee covered by the merit pay system established under
section 5402 of this title, all references in this section to 'two steps' or "two step-
increases' shall be deemed to mean 6 percent.".
(g) Section 5335(e) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by insening after "indi-
vidual" the following: "covered by the meni pay system established under section 5402
of this title, or,".
(h) Seciion 5336(c) of title 5, United States Code, is amended by insening after "indi-
vidual" the following: "covered by the merit pay system established under section 5402
of this title, or,".
(i) The table of chapters for pan III of title 5, United States Code, is amended by in-
sening after the item relating to chapter 53 the following new item:
"54. Ment Pay and Cash Awards 5401".
Effective Date
Sec. 504. (a) The provisions of this title shall take effect on the first day of the first
applicable pay period which begins on or after October 1, 1981, except that such provi-
sions may take effect with respect to any category or categories of positions before such
day to the extent prescnbed by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management.
(b) The Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall include in the first
report required under section 5404 of title 5, United States Code (as added by this title),
information with respect to the progress and cost of the implementation of the merit
pay system and the cash award program established under chapter 54 of such title (as




FY 1980 GENERAL SCHEDULE PAY RATES
Effective 10-05-80
New General Schedule Pay Rates
The folluwinj: i? the Al'.crruitivc Plan Adjuj-tmcni for October 1980, for General Schedule
employees. su'omiiieJ lo Conprcs;. by PreaiCJent Ciirier;
Str^m
GS 1 o 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 79G0 8225 8490 8755 i*020 9069 9189 9144 9699 9954
2 S?51 9n69 9242 9531 9^20 10109 10398 10687 10976 11265
3 97G6 10092 10418 10744 11070 1 1 396 11722 12048 12374 12700
4 109G3 11328 11 693 12058 .2423 127fl8 13153 13518 13883 14248
5 12266 12675 13084 13493 13902 14311 14720 15129 If. 538 15947
6 13672 14128 14584 15040 15496 15ro2 16408 16864 17320 17776
7 15193 15699 16205 16711 17217 17723 18229 18735 19241 19747
8 1G826 17387 17948 1S5U9 19070 19631 20192 20753 21214 2IS75
9 1S5S5 19205 19^25 20445 21065 21685 22305 22925 23515 24165
10 20-167 21149 21b3l 22513 23195 23877 24559 2524
1
25923 26605
11 22486 23236 23986 2 5736 25486 26236 26986 27736 28486 29236
12 26951 275>49 28747 29645 30543 31441 32339 33237 34135 36033
13 32048 33116 34184 35252 3r>320 37388 38456 39524 40592 41C60
14 37871 39133 40395 4 1 657 42919 44181 45443 46705 47967 49229
15 44547 4GU32 47517 49i)U2 50487* 51972* 53457* 54942* 56427* 57912'
16 49193 50838* 52478* 54118* 5o758* 57398* 58500* 58500* 58500*
17 53&49" 55644' 57439* 5<=.500* 58500*
18 5d50U*





[MPTROLLER GENERAL DECISION B-203022
OECISIOIM n^n^y.] OP TH« UIMITBD • TAT E •
W/AaHINOTON. O.C. SOS4a
FILE: B-203022 DATE: September 8, 1981
•MATTER OF: Office of Personnel Management's Implementation of
Merit Pay
DIGEST: i^ -j^ merit pay provisions of the Civil Service Reform
Act (5 U.S.C. 5 5401 et sec.) require that the merit
pay system cost no more tnan the pre-merit pay systeir
Merit pay system is only meant to redistribute funds
wnich would otnerwise have Oeen spent on certain sal-
ary increases under pre-merit pay system. Accord-
ingly, 0PM should revise its merit pay cailculations
for within-grade step increase and quality step in-
crease components of merit pay pool according to what
e^encies would have otherwise spent on these types of
*!..ary increases under the merit pay system.
2. 0PM should not add "capped" funds, which would have
been paid to certain merit pay employees if not for
the salary ceiling, to the fund to be used for merit
pay awards. "R^e ceiling imposed on salaries pursuant
to certain appropriations restrictions is a limitation
on the merit pay system in that funds which could not
have been paid under the pre-merit pay system are not
to be included in the merit pay pool.
During the course of an audit of the implementation by the Office
of Personnel Management (0PM) of the Merit Pay System under the Civil
Service Reform Act (CSRA), we have found that the method used by 0PM
to calculate amounts available for merit pay payouts by agencies does
not conform to the requirenents of the Act.
Under provisions contained in 5 U.S.C. S 5402(b)(4), 0PM is
recuired to determine the amount of funds available for the merit pay
program of each Executive agency and department prior to the beginning
of eacn fiscal year. 0PM construes this provision of the merit pay
statute differently than does this Office. Iliese differences center
upon the extent of the discretion granted OPM oy this statute to cal-
culate the amount available to each agency and department for merit
pay. This statute reads as follow:
"(4) The funds available for the purpose of this
subsection to the head of any agency for any fiscal
year shall be determined before the beginning of the
fiscal year by the Office (of Personnel Management] on
the basis of the amount estimated by the Office to be
necessary to reflect
—
"(A) within-step increases and quality step increases
which would have Deen paid under suochapter III [General

B-203022
Schedule Pay Rates] of charter 53 [Pay Rates and Systems]
of this title during the fiscal year to the employees of
the agency covered by the nierit pay system if the em-
ployees were not so covered ; and
"(B) adjustments under section 33C5 [annual pay
reports and adiusuT>ent3j of this title which would have
been ceid under such subcr.aoter during tne fiscal vear
to sucn employees if tne errloyee; were not so covered ^
less an airtount refiectir.c zr.e ac] us—Tien" under suosec-
ticn {c)(l) of tnis section m rat^s ci oasic pay pay-
able to the employees for tne fiscal year." [Suosection
(c)(1) allows CPM to reduce annual cost of living in-
creases for merit pay participants by as m>uch as 50 per-
cent.] (Eirphasis added.) 5 'J.S.C. § 5402(d)(4).
It is OPf^'s pxDsition, in essence, that the statutory authorization
to CPM to estimate the amount necessary to reflect salary increases
which would nave oeen received by merit pay participants ander the pre-
merit pay s\'stem was intentionally drafted to give OPM the broadest
possible discretion in detenrming tne mierit pay pool. CP*'. also relies
on its statutory responsibilities under the Civil Sen/ice Reform Act as
a whole to devise an equitable merit pay system which will be accepted
as such by merit pay participants. Thus, C?y. relieves it is authorized
to add funds to the merit pay pool in excess of wnat actually would
have been spent had merit pay not oeen implemented, to satisfy certain
objectives such as ensuring that no employee be penalized due to the
implementation of merit pay and ensuring that the average annual salary
rate of all employees suciect to merit pay be equivalent to what their
average annual salary rate would have oeen under the pre-merit pay
system.
CXir Office's position, on the other hand, is that the quoted
provision limits CPM to estimates of tne amounts which would have been
paid for within-grade , Quality step, and comparability increases if
merit pay employees were still urioer tne old system. 1/ Further, this
!_/ In this regard this Office does not ob;]ect to regulations promul-
gated by 0PM at 5 CFR 54C.1 03(d) wnich permit agencies to expend an
amount no less than 95 percent and no greater than 105 percent of the
merit pay figure provided annually by CPM. 0PM' s formula is based on
estimates of events which would not be susceptible to precise determi-
nation before the fact even in tne absence of the merit pay situation.
In view of the imprecise nature of the estimates, we believe that 0PM




provision's legislative history convincingly demonstrates that Con-
gress intended for tne merit pay system to cost no more than the
amount expended under the pre-merit pay system. It was the intent of
the Congress that tiie implementation of the merit pay system would
only redistribute an amount essentially equal to the amount expended
under the pre-merit pay system.
IViis intent is clearly expressed in statements made by
President Carter, by the Giairman and Deputy Executive Director of
tne Civil Service Comm.ission (currently CF**.), and by statements con-
tained in tne Senate and House ComrTiittee Reports. President Carter,
in a messaae to the Conaress, stated tnat the merit pay system "* * *
would not increase payroll costs * * *." (Wee.Kly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, Marcn 2, 1978). This position was reiterated
by l^ie Honorar)le Alan K. Campoell, Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Com-
mission when he stated: "The net effect of these changes [the merit
pay rystem ) is that employees as a group will receive neitner more
nor less than tney presently do, but those individuals performing m
a superior fashion will receive higner salary increases." (Civil Ser-
vice Reform Act of 1978 and reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1978: Hearings
on S. 2640, S. 2707, and S. 2830 oefore the Caimittee on Governmental
Affairs United States Senate, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1978)). Also,
Mr. Gecrae J. McQuoid , Deputy Executive Director, U.S. Civil Service
Corrar.issio.i, m responding to Questions from tne staff of tne Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs in the aDOve cited Hearings stated:
"There will be no impact, either plus or minus, on
overall payroll and benefit costs as a result of the
introduction of the merit pay program.. Under the pro-
qram., funds which, under the present sv'stem, would be
expended automatically would be redistributed oased
upon meritorious performance ratner tnan time in grade."
.Moreover, in a section-by-section analysis of S. 2640, Trie Civil Ser/ice
Reform, Act, by the Senate Governmental Affairs Corrmittee, it is stated:
"Ttse merit pay system would not require additional
expenditure of money. Ihe money saved from not award-
ma full across-tne-Doard comparability increases and
autom.atic step increases would be used to reward those
employees who deserve pay raises or bonuses.** S. Rep.
No. 95-969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1978).
Finally, ooth the Senate and House Conirittee Reports contain cost
estimates from the Congressional Budget Office stating that the imple-
mentation of the merit pay system would have no effect on the total




95th Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1978); H.R. Rep. No. 95-1403, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 94 (1978).
Ttie fundamental issue, as we see it, centers around proper
determination of the size of the "appropriation" Congress has made
available for merit pay purposes. In our opinion, the terms of
S 5402(b)(4), quoted above, coupled with the cojnpletely consistent
legislative history, clearly demonstrate that the Act was only meant
to redistribute funds and not to provide additional funds for salary
increases. 0PM 's development of the merit pay formula must coirply
with this restriction. In our view, it is not permissible under the
CSRA for 0PM to calculate funds available for agency merit pay pro-
grams which would result in more money being expended under the merit
pay system than would have been spent under the pre-merit pay system.
Ccdculations by our audit staff demonstrate, however, that the amounts
allowed by 0PM' s formula for pre-merit pay within-grade and quality
step increases overstates by $58 to $74 million dollars the amounts
which would have been paid to merit pay employees if they were still
under the previous system. Furthermore, 0PM* s formula includes amounts
for within-grade, quality step, and comparability increases vrtiich would
be due merit pay employees who are at or above the statutory pay cap
of $50,112.50 if the cap did not exist or were lifted. Ttiis has the
potential of permitting these funds, none of which would have been
spent under the pre-merit pay system, to be used for merit pay awards
to employees whose salaries are not limited by the pay cap.
Our analysis of how 0PM' s computation of these three facets of the
merit pay formula will result in additional money being spent on merit
pay is as follows:
Within-grade Step Increases
Vttien determining the within-grade step increase compcxient of merit
pay, 0PM assumes that each employee eligible for merit pay would have
received a within-grade step increase under the prior program on
October 1, the beginning of the fiscal year. By computing the within-
grade increase component of the merit pay pool as if it were due at
the beginning of the fiscal year, 0PM is establishing a formula which
overstates the amount of money which would have been expended on
within-grade increases but for merit pay. This is because eligible
employees under the pre-merit pay system would have received within-
grade increases on their particular anniversary dates, which dates
fall throughout the fiscal year. 0PM believes that this is necessary
because only by using this formula can it assure that the group of
employees who would have received within-grade increases during the




of merit pay will not be penalized. CPM also maintains that use of
the October 1 date is necessary for it to ensure that the average
annual salary rate of all employees subject to merit pay will be equiv-
alent to what the average annual salary rates of these employees would
have been under the pre-merit pay system.
In our opinion, the computing of the within-grade increase
component of the merit pay pool in T±iis manner does not conform to
the mandates of the CSRA. To ensure compliance with the CSRA, this
component of the formula should reflect as precisely as possible what
otherwise would have been actually spent on within-grade increases.
Thus, CPM should compute the percentage agencies would have actually
allocated from their payrolls for tlie awarding of within^rade in-
creases but for merit pay in a given year and this figure should be
used as part of the determination of the funds available for merit pay
increases. While 0PM 's method of calculating within-grade increases
apparently will assure that the average annual salary rate of employees
under merit pay will be equivalent to what it would have been under the
pre-merit pay system, this is not required by the CSRA. Similarly, the
CSRA does not authorize 0PM to adjust the merit pay formula to assure
that enployees who would have been due within-grade increases during
the first half of fiscal 1982 will receive under merit pay what they
would have otherwise received under the pre-merit pay system. Moreover,
this seems contrary to the CSRA's basic concept of rewarding meritorious
performance rather than longevity of service.
Quality Steo Increases
When calculating the quality step increase component of the merit
pay pool, 0PM includes what it believes agencies should have spent on
this type of salary increase in the past rather than the amount agencies
have historically spent. It is true that the CSRA does not mandate that
in cal. jlating the quality step increase or within-grade increase coti-
pon'-;n; of the merit pay pool, 0PM compute these carponents to reflect
what agencies have historically spent on these two types of salary in-
creases. Instead, the Act only requires 0PM to estimate what would have
been paid to employees during the fiscal year if they were not covered
by merit pay. This can most logically, in our view, be achieved by
referring to historical data. However, there may be other ways to sat-
ist/ *-.his requirement and it is in 0PM' s discretion to determine the
best possible method to meet this requirement for the various compo-
nents of the pool. Thus, although agencies have historically only
spent .1 percent of their payrolls on quality step increases, 0PM would
be authorized to use the .4 percent of payroll costs for this component
it is proposing to use if 0PM can show that a change in historical prac-




quality step increases in fiscal year 1982. However, if agencies will
continue to spend only .1 percent of their total payroll costs on
quality step increases for non-fnerit pay employees in fiscal year
1982/ in our view, 0PM in computing this portion of the pool should
only use .1 percent of total payroll costs even if 0PM maintains that
this will effectively result in the continued underutilization of
quality step increases. In other words, unless 0PM takes positive
steps to assure that non-merit pay quality step increases total .4 per-
cent of salaries Government-wide, we can see no justification for using
such a percentage for merit pay pool purposes.
Increments Above the Statutory Pay Ceiling
0PM includes, as part of its merit pay pool computations, amounts
for within-grade step increases, quality step increases, and compar-
ability increases which would have been paid to employees under the
pre-merit pay system if it were not for the statutory cap imposed on
salaries, currently fixed at $50,112.50. 0PM 's procedures require that
employees whose salaries exceed the cap receive accounting or "paper"
increases in order that their proper pay rate will be established if
the cap is ever lifted. This Office agrees that these CTtployees must
receive "paper" increases. We do not believe, however, these increases
may be included in the merit pay pool if the possibility exists that
these capped funds might be distributed to employees eligible for merit
pay who have not reached this ceiling. A distribution of this sort
will result in additional funds in the merit pay pool because these
funds would not have been expended under the pre-merit pay systen,
given the continued existence of the pay cap. In our view, this is
not permitted by the CSPA. In this regard, we would not object, in
principle, to the use of "paper" salary increases which would other-
wise be due capped employees for purposes of calculating how much
money would be in the merit pay pool for capped and non-capped em-
ployees if the cap did not exist. However, we can see no justifica-
tion for distribution to non-capped merit pay employees of any of
these "paper" increases because none of these fuixSs would be payable
under the pre-merit pay system.
Conclusion
As indicated above, our audit staff has determined that the
above-described CPM calculations of the various components of merit
pay will make available to all executive agencies, collectively, ap-
proximately $58 - $74 million dollars more every year for merit pay
expenditures than would have been expended under the pre-merit pay




manner which leads to this result is contrary to the language and in-
tent of the CSPA. Accordingly, CPM should take irrar.ediate action to






1st Session H. R. 1841
To amend chapter 54 of title 5, United States Code, to reform the merit pay
svstem.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATRT:S
Maech 2, 1983
Mr. Wolf (for himself. Mr. Whitehukst, and Mr. P.utKis) introduced the fol-
loM^Tng bill: which was referred to the Committee on Post Office and CIntI
Service
A BILL
To amend chapter 54 of title 5, United States Code, to reform
the merit pay system.
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SHORT TITLE
4 Section 1. This Act mav be cited as the "Merit Pav
5 Reform Act of 1983".
6 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND RECOGNITION SYSTEM
7 Sec. 2. (a) Chapter 54 of title 5, United States Code, is
8 amended to read as follows:
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"5403. Periormance manaffemem and recognition system.
"5404. Cash award program.
"5405. Report.
"5406. Regulations.
2 "§ 5401. Purpose
3 "It is the purpose of this chapter to provide for a per-
4 formance management and recognition system which shall
—
5 "(1) use performance appraisals as the basis for
6 determining basic pay and performance awards;
7 "(2) within available funds, recognize and reward
8 quality performance by varying levels of performance
9 awards:
10 "(3) within available funds. pro\ide for training to
1
1
improve accuracy and fairness in the evaluation of per-
12 formance;
13 "(4) regulate the costs of performance awards by
14 establishing funding level restrictions; and
15 "(o) pro\ide the means to reduce or withhold pay
16 increases for less than fully successful performance.
17 "§ 5402. Coverage
18 "(a) This chapter shall apply to any supervisor or man-
19 ager who is in a position which is in GS-13, 14, or 15 of the
20 General Schedule described in section 5104 of this title and
21 whose responsibilities include supervising the work of one or
22 more professional-level employees. For the purposes of this
23 chapter, managerial or supervi>sory status shall be determined
IIK IKil 111 71:

1 in accordance '^^ith Office of Personnel Management ciassifi-
2 cation standards.
3 "(bKD Upon application under paragraph (3) of this sub-
4 section, the President may, in \\Titing, exclude an agency,
5 any unit of an agency, or any class of employees within any
6 such unit from the application of this chapter if the President
7 considers such exclusion to be required as a result of condi-
8 tions arising from
—
9 "(A) the recent establishment of the agency, unit.
10 or class, or the implementation of a new program,
11 "(B) an emergency situation, or
12 "(C) any other situation or circumstance.
13 "(2) Any exclusion under this subsection shall not take
14 effect earlier than 30 calendar days after the President trans-
15 mits to each House of the Congress a report describing the
16 agency, unit, or class to be excluded and the reasons there-
17 for.
18 "(3) An application for exclusion under this subsection
19 of an agency, any unit of an agency, or any class of employ-
20 ees within any such unit shall be filed by the head of the
21 agency with the Office of Personnel Management, and shall
22 set forth reasons why the agency, unit, or class should be
23 excluded from this chapter. The Office shall review the appli-
24 cation and reasons, undertake such other review as it consid-




1 class should be excluded from the coverage of this chapter,
2 and upon completion of its review, recommend to the Presi-
3 dent whether the agency, unit, or class should be so ex-
4 eluded.
5 "(4) Any agency, unit, or class which is excluded pursu-
6 ant to this subsection shall, insofar as practicable, make a
7 sustained effort to eliminate the conditions on which the ex-
8 elusion is based.
9 "(5) The Office shall periodically review any exclusion
10 from coverage and mav at anv time recommend to the Presi-
11 dent that an exclusion under this subsection be revoked. The
12 President may at any time revoke, in wTiting, any exclusion
13 under this subsection.
14 "(cj This chapter shall not apply to individuals employed
15 under the Office of the Architect of the Capitol or the Bo-
16 tanic Garden.
IT "§5403. Performance management and recognition
18 system
19 "(al In accordance with the purpose set forth in section
20 5401 of this title, the Office of Personnel Management shall
21 establish a performance management and recognition system
22 which shall provide for
—
23 "(1) a range of basic pay for each grade to which
24 the system applies, which range shall be limited by the




1 each grade under chapter 53 of this title, except as
2 otherwise pro^nded for in this section;
3 *'(2) pay increases within such range, consisting of
4 comparability pay increases and periodic step-increases
5 (under section 5335 of this title), to the extent pro-
6 Wded under subsection (c). based upon perfonnance:
7 and
S "(3) performance awards, to the extent provided
9 under subsection (d), based upon performance.
10 "(b) Under regulations prescribed by the Office, the
11 head of each agency shall pro\ide for increases within the
12 range of basic pay for any employee covered by the perform-
13 ance management and recognition system.
14 "(c)(1) Determinations to pro\ide comparability pay in-
15 creases under subsection (a)(2) shall, for any pay adjustment
Ui period, be made based upon the level of performance of the
IT employee involved, as most recently determined under chap-
18 ter 43 of this title. If the employee's performance is rated
19 at—
2(' "(A) either of the two levels below fully success-
21 ful, no comparability increase shall be provided; or
22 "(B) the fully successful level or either of the two
23 levels above fully successful, the full comparability in-




1 "(2)(A) For purposes of section 5335 of this title, the
2 performance of an employee under this chapter shall be con-
3 sidered to be of an acceptable level of competence, \vithin the
4 meaning of subsection (a) of such section, if such employee's
5 most recent rating under chapter 43 of this title was at the
6 fully successful level or either of the 2 levels above fully suc-
7 cessful.
8 "(B) For purposes of section 5335 of this title, and not-
9 withstanding subsection (c) of such section, a determination
10 that the work of an employee under this chapter is not of an
1
1
acceptable level of competence (as described in subparagraph
12 (A)) shall be subject to re\iew only in accordance with and to
13 the extent pro\'ided by procedures established by the head of
14 the agency.
15 "(d)(1) If the employee's performance is rated above
16 fully successful, the employee may be paid a performance
IT award in accordance with the pro\isions of this subsection.
18 Any such award shall be in addition to any increase in basic
19 pay provided under subsection (c).
20 "(2) A performance award under this subsection may be
21 made in such amount as the head of the agency considers
22 appropriate, except that any such award may not exceed an




1 "(3)(A) For any fiscal year, the head of any agency may
2 exercise authority under this subsection only to the extent of
3 the funds available for the purposes of this subsection.
4 "(E) Performance awards under this subsection shall be
5 paid from funds or appropriations available to the agency for
6 pay of employees.
7 (C) The funds available for the purposes of this subsec-
8 tion with respect to any agency may not exceed an amount
9 equal to one and one-half percent of the aggregate amount of
10 basic pay which will be payable to the employees of the
11 agency who are covered by the pert'ormance management
12 and recognition system for the fiscal year involved. Such
13 amount shall be determined by the Office of Personnel Man-
14 agement before the beginning of such fiscal year.
15 "(e)(1) The comparabiHty increase, for purposes of sub-
16 section (c)(1), shall be an amount equal to the basic pay of the
17 employee involved multiplied by the percentage increase ap-
18 plicable to the grade or level of the position of such employee
19 under section 5305 of this title at the beginning of the pay
20 adjustment period.
21 "(2) For purposes of determining the comparability in-
22 crease applicable to an employee under paragraph (1), such
23 employee's rate of basic pay as of the day immediately pre-




1 "(f) The pay adjustment period in any fiscal year shall
2 be the period begfinning on the first day of the first applicable
3 pay period commencing on or after the first day of the month
4 in which an adjustment takes effect under section 5305 of
5 this title and ending at the close of the day preceding the
6 following pay adjustment period.
7 "(g) Any employee whose position is brought under the
8 performance management and recognition system shall, so
9 long as the employee continues to occupy the position, be
10 entitled to receive basic pay at a rate of basic pay not less
11 than the rate the employee was recei\Tng when the position




14 "(h) Under this section, an employee may be paid less
15 than the minimum rate of basic pay of the grade of the em-
16 pioyee's position to the extent that it is the result of a per-
17 formance evaluation of less than fully successful.
18 "(i) Under regulations prescribed by the Office, the
19 benefit of advancement through the range of basic pay for a
20 grade shall be preserved for any employee covered by the
21 performance management and recognition system whose con-
22 tinuous service is interrupted in the public interest by service
23 ^^'ith the armed forces, or by service in essential non-Govem-






1 "(j) For the purpose of section 5941 of this title, rates of
2 basic pay of employees covered by the performance manage-
3 ment and recognition system shall be considered rates of
4 basic pay fixed by statute.
5 "§ 5404. Cash award program
6 "(a) The head of any agency may pay a cash award to,
7 and incur necessary expenses for the honorary recognition of,
8 any employee covered by the performance management and
9 recognition system who
—
10 "(1) by the employee's suggestion, invention, su-
11 perior accomphshment, or other personal effort, con-
12 tributes to the efficiency, economy, or other improve-
13 ment of Government operations or achieves a signifi-
14 cant reduction in paperwork; or
15 *'(2) performs a special act or service in the public
16 interest in connection with or related to the employee's
IT Federal emplojinent.
18 "(b) The President may pay a cash award to, and incur
19 necessary expenses for the honorarv' recognition of, any em-
20 ployee covered by the performance management and recogni-
21 tion system who
—
22 "(1) by the employee's suggestion, invention, su-
23 perior accomplishment, or other personal effort, con-
24 tributes to the efficiency, economy, or other improve-
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1 ment of Govemment operations or achieves a signifi-
2 cant reduction in paperwork; or
3 "(2) performs an exceptionally meritorious special
4 act or service in the public interest in connection with
5 or related to the employee's Federal employment.
6 A Presidential cash award may be in addition to an agency
7 cash award under subsection (a) of this section.
8 "(c) A cash award to any employee under this section is
9 in addition to the basic pay of the employee, or any perform-
10 ance award paid to such employee, under section 5403 of this
11 title. Acceptance of a cash award under this section consti-
12 tutes an agreement that the use by the Govemment of any
13 idea, method, or device for which the award is made does not
14 form the basis of any claim of any nature against the Govem-
15 ment by the employee accepting the award, or the employ-
16 ee's heirs or assigns.
17 "(d) A cash award to, and expenses for the honorary
18 recognition of, any employee covered by the performance
19 management and recognition system may be paid from the
20 fund or appropriation available to the activity primarily bene-
21 fiting, or the various activities benefiting, from the sugges-
22 tion, invention, superior accomplishment, or other meritori-
23 ous effort of the employee. The head of the agency concerned
24 shall determine the amount to be contributed by each activity




1 The President shall determine the amount to be contributed
2 by each activity to a Presidential award under subsection (b)
3 of this section.
4 "(e) A cash award under subsection (a) may not exceed
5 20 percent of the basic pay of the employee involved.
6 "(f) The President or the head of an agency may pay a
7 cash award under this section notwithstanding the death or
8 separation from the service of an employee, if the suggestion,
9 invention, superior accomplishment, or other meritorious
10 effort of the employee for which the award is proposed was
11 made or performed while the employee was covered by the
12 performance management and recognition system.
13 "§ 5405. Report
14 "The Office of Personnel Management shall submit an
15 annual report to the President and each House of Congress
16 evaluating the effectiveness of the performance management
IT and recognition system. Each such report shall be prepared
18 after consultation with the respective heads of a sufficient
19 range of agencies so as to permit an adequate basis for
20 making a meaningful evaluation.
21 **§ 5406. Regulations
22 "The Office of Personnel Management shall prescribe
23 regulations to carry out the purpose of this chapter.".





1 (A) in sections 4501(2)(A), 5332(a), 5334(f), and
2 5336(c), by striking out ''the merit pay system estab-
3 lished under section 5402" each place it appears and
4 inserting in lieu thereof "the performance management
5 and recognition system established under section
6 5403";
7 (B) in section 5361(5), by striking out "merit pay
8 system" and inserting in lieu thereof "performance
9 management and recognition system"; and
10 (C) in section 5948(g)(1)(C), by striking out
11 "Merit Pay System" and inserting in lieu thereof "per-
12 formance management and recognition system".
13 (2) Section 1602 of title 10, United States Code, and
14 section 5(b) of the General Accounting Office Personnel Act
15 of 1980 (31 U.S.C. 52-4(b)) are each amended by striking
16 out "5401(a)" and inserting in lieu thereof "5401".
17 PEEIODIC STEP-INCEEASE CONFOEMING AMENDMENT
18 Sec. 3. Section 5335 of title 5, United States Code, is
19 amended by striking out subsection (e) and inserting in heu
20 thereof the following:
21 "(e) This section does not apply to the pay of an individ-
22 ual appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
23 consent of the Senate.
24 "(0 This section applies to individuals covered by the




1 chapter 54 of this title, as provided in section 5403(c)(2) of
2 this title.".
3 PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL SYSTEM CONFORMING
4 AMENDMENTS
5 Sec. 4. (a) Chapter 43 of title 5, United States Code,
6 relating to performance appraisals, is amended by inserting
7 after section 4302 the follo^^ing new section:
8 "§ 4302a. Establishment of performance appraisal systems
9 for performance management and recogni-
10 tion system employees
11 "(a) Each agency shall develop a performance appraisal
12 system for employees covered by the performance manage-
13 ment and recognition system established under section 5403
14 of this title which
—
15 "(1) provides for periodic appraisals of job per-
16 formance;
17 "(2) requires that the supervising official consult
18 with the employee before establishing performance
19 standards: and
20 "(3) uses the results of performance appraisals as
21 a basis for setting the base pay and performance
22 awards for an employee in accordance with section




1 "(b) Under relations which the Office of Personnel
2 Management shall prescribe, each such perfonnance apprais-
3 al system shall provide for
—
4 "(1) 5 levels of performance ratings as follows:
5 "(A) 2 levels which are below fully success-
6 ful;
7 "(B) a fully successful level: and
8 "(C) 2 levels which are above fully success-
9 ful;
10 "(2) establishing performance standards and criti-
11 cal elements which will, to the maximum extent feasi-
12 ble, permit the accurate evaluation of job performance;
13 "(3) at the beginnmg of each appraisal period,
14 communicating to each employee covered by the per-
15 formance management and recognition system the per-
16 formance standards and critical elements of the em-
17 ployee's position;
18 "(4) during the appraisal period, evaluating each
19 such employee on the basis of such standards;
20 "(5) assisting such employees in improving less
21 than fully successful performance;
22 "(6) reassigning, reducing in grade, or removing
23 such employees who continually perform below fully
24 successful, after providing an opportunity to provide




1 "(7) making base pay increase and performance
2 award decisions as a result of annual performance ap-
3 praisals made under this section.
4 "(c) Appraisals of performance under this section
—
5 "(1) shall take into account individual perform-
6 ance,
7 "(2) may take into account organizational accom-
8 plishment, and
9 "(3) shall take into account such factors as
10 "(A) any improvement in efficiency, produc-
11 ti\ity, and quality of work or ser^^ce, including
12 any significant reduction in paperwork;
13 "(B) cost efficiency;
14 "(C) timeliness of performance; and
15 "(D) other indications of the effectiveness.
16 producti\ity, and quality of performance of the
17 employee or other employees for whom the em-
18 ployee is responsible; and
19 "(4) shall be subject to re\iew only in accordance
20 with and to the extent pro\aded by procedures esiab-
21 lished by the head of the agency.
22 "(d) The Office of Personnel Management may not pre-





1 "(1) any preestablished distribution of levels of
2 performance ratings among employees covered under
3 chapter 54 of this title; or
4 "(2) any specific performance standard or ele-
5 ment.".
6 (b) The table of sections for chapter 43 of title 5, United
7 States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating
8 to section 4302 the following new item:
'4302a. Establishment of performance appraisal systems for penormance manage-
ment and recognition system employees.".
9 EFFECTIVE DATE; SAVINGS PROVISIONS; CONTINUATION
10 OF AMENDMENTS
11 Sec. 5. (a) The amendments made by this Act shall take
12 effect on the first day of the first applicable pay period com-
13 mencing after the first September 30th following the date of
14 the enactment of this Act.
15 (b)(1) An employee whose position was covered by the
16 merit pay system immediately before the effective date of this
17 Act but is determined not to be covered by the performance
18 management and recognition system as a result of this Act
19 shall be converted on such effective date to the General
20 Schedule in accordance "^ith regulations issued by the Office
21 of Personnel Management pursuant to section 5334(a) of this
22 title.
23 (2) The rate of basic pay for any employee whose posi-




1 the effective date of this Act and is determined to be under
2 the performance management and recognition system as a
3 result of this Act shall be at least equal to the rate of basic
4 pay payable for the position held by such employee immedi-
5 ately before the effective date of this Act.
6 (c)(1) The amendments made by this Act shall continue
7 to have effect unless, during the first period of 60 calendar
8 days of continuous session of the Congress beginning after 5
9 years after the effective date of such amendments, a concur-
10 rent resolution is introduced and adopted by the Congress
11 disappro\dng the continuation of the performance manage-
12 ment and recognition system. Such amendments shall cease
13 to have effect on the first dav of the first fiscal vear beirinnin^
14 after the date of the adoption of such concurrent resolution.
15 (2) The continuity of a session is broken only by an ad-
16 joumment of the Congress sine die, and the days on wiiich
17 either House is not in session because of an adjournment of
18 more than 3 days to a day certain are excluded in the compu-







MERIT PAY REFORM LEGISLATION
SECTION - BY - SECTION ANALYSIS
TITLE: Merit Pay Reform Experiment of 1983
SECOND SECTION, Amendments to Chapter 54 of Title 5, U.S. Code
This section replaces the former Merit Pay System with a five
year experimental performance recognition system for improving the
performance of key supervisory and managerial personnel in Grades
13 through 15 of the General Schedule.
Under the former Merit Pay System, supervisory and non-super-
visory m.anagement officials in Grade 13 through 15 of the General
Schedule were eligible for base pay increases and cash awards based
on performance. In addition, they received one-half of the annual
comparability adjustment without regard to their performance. The
new Merit Pay Reform system will cover only supervisors and managers
with supervisory responsibility. It will continue to tie base pay
increases to performance. Within grade increases and the annual
com.parability adjustment will be granted only for fully successful
perform.ance or better.
For less than fully successful performiance , however, no within
grade increases or annual com.parability adjustment will be granted.
Performance recognition and other incentive awards for special acts
or achievemients may be granted to recognize on-the-job performance
or inventions, suggestions and other improvements to the Federal
service. In no event, however, will agency funding for performance
recognition awards exceed 1^ percent of the total base salaries
of the supervisors and m.anagers covered by this program.
At the end of the five-year period, a decision to continue or
stop this experimental program will be made by Congress based on
agency recommendations.
SECTION 5401. Sets forth the purpose of the Merit Pay Reform system.
It shall provide performance-based pay recognition for high quality
supervisory and managerial performiance. Less than fully successful
perform.ers, however, will receive no pay increases. Within a-^'ailable
funds, continuing training is to be provided to supervisors and
managers to improve the accuracy and effectiveness of the Merit Pay
Reform system.
SECTION 5402. Defines the coverage of the system. Any GS 13 through
15 employee who supervises at least one professional level employee
will be included in the system. Office of Personnel Management
classification standards for supervisors and managers will be used
to provide coverage guidance instead of the current practice of
using the labor relations definition of supervisor and management
official codified in 5 USC 7103.
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SECTION 5403. Establishes uniform performance rating levels for
simplicity and equity. Ratings will be based on a 5-point scale
ranging from unsuccessful, marginally successful to fully successful/
highly successful, and outstanding.
In accordance with this 5-point scale, comparability increases
and within grade increases would be granted only to those with a
fully successful rating or better. For those rated below fully
successful, no comparability increase or within grade increase would
be provided.
At no time could such an award exceed 20 percent of basic pay.
Such an award would not affect the base pay of an individual --
rather it would be a lump sum pav^nent.
Awards provided under Chapter 45 of Title 5 for inventions,
helpful suggestions, achievements, and other special acrs v.-ould be
retained for these mid-level supervisors as well.
Funding for performance awards would not exceed 1^ percent of
total base salaries of the agencies' supervisors and managers covered
by this program.
SECTION 5404. Each year, CPM, in consultation with the agencies,
shall submit a report on the operation of the experim.ent no the
President and Congress evaluating the effectiveness of the Merit: Fay
Reformi system.
SECTION 5405. This section outlines technical and confcrmixig amendments
Under the Merit Pay Reform experiment, supervisors of employees
covered by this system will be required to discuss the critical
elements and standards used to appraise the performance of covered
employees prior to the start of the appraisal period.
A five-level appraisal system is established. In addition, there
will be no forced ratings distribution under the experiment.
This section delegates authority to 0PM to issue implementing
regulations and to prescribe any reporting requirements needed to set
up and operate this experim.ent.
At the end of the 5-year experiment, within 60 days of the issuance
of 0PM* s final report on the project. Congress must adopt a concurrent
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